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# STUDY PROJECT

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## THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPEAN SECURITY: DETERMINING FACTORS

BY

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THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPEAN SECURITY:  
DETERMINING FACTORS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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## ABSTRACT

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
PREFACE.....	iv
INTRODUCTION: DIFFERENT ERAS, SIMILAR CHALLENGES.....	1
CHAPTER	
I. POST-WORLD WAR II CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, 1945-1948.....	7
1945: Withering of an Alliance.....	7
1946: Period of Transition.....	16
1947: New Challenges and New Directions.....	25
1948: Toward a Mutual Defense.....	32
1945-1948: Evolving Commitment.....	46
II. CURRENT AND NEAR-TERM CHALLENGES, 1990-1993.....	57
Prologue: The Security Environment.....	57
Future Security Role: Deciding Factors.....	67
Security Requirements.....	68
American Policies and Perceptions.....	72
European Policies and Perceptions.....	93
1990-1993: Consensus and Uncertainty.....	127
III. 1945-1948 AND 1990-1993: LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLIED.....	140
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	149

## PREFACE

Dramatic and unanticipated events have jolted the world, particularly Europe, during recent years. Longstanding assumptions about the present and presumptions regarding the future became outdated or irrelevant almost overnight. Within this torrent of change and climate of uncertainty, a dominating issue of debate has been the topic of future European security. Given the devastating two World Wars in the first half of the century--mainly emanating from Europe--and the tremendous efforts during the latter half of the century to prevent another World War--also primarily oriented toward Europe--it is understandable that the question of future European security is one of major concern.

Within the overall context of European security, the relationship of the United States to that security is an issue that has grown of increasing importance throughout the 20th century. Since World War II the American relationship has become arguably the predominant factor in achieving and maintaining European security. In the current period of change, this American relationship has been opened to serious question and debate on both sides of the Atlantic. Prospects

for a "New World Order", pressures for domestic retrenchment, possibilities for European integration and unity--are all serving to influence the nature of European security and America's role within it.

There is no question that the topic of European security and the future American role is one of current relevance. The debate of issues can be seen daily in journals, newspapers and on television, and the story will continue to unfold in the future as conscious decisions and unforeseen events combine to shape the outcome. No one paper or even series of papers or books can capture the totality of the topic or anticipate its outcome. What can be done, however, is to attempt to grasp the nature of the issues at question and to understand the primary factors influencing the present and the future.

This work addresses the subject of these "determining factors" shaping the future American role in European security. It is not an attempt to predict future outcomes, nor is it an effort to prescribe future policies for Europe or the United States. Rather, this is a modest effort at analyzing this topic and viewing it from the perspective of recent historical "wisdom."

The 1990s are not the first time that the question of the American role in European security has been addressed. Nor is it a completely unique period of uncertainty and change in which old roles and new challenges have been assessed and debated. In the immediate post-World War II period, 1945-1948, the question of European security and America's future role was a major issue, if not a dominating issue facing both



the United States and European nations. The outcome at that time was neither obvious nor easily predicted, except within the prism of historical hindsight. Circumstances facing the world then differed from those of the 1990s, but the fundamental question was the same--how best can European security be achieved and what role does the United States have in achieving that security?

Historical comparison can lead to a better understanding of the process of decision-making today and into the future. Through such understanding, especially of the factors most likely to shape events and decisions, there can be greater likelihood of influencing outcomes, or at least not being surprised by them.

The primary focus of this study will be essentially the 1990-1993 time-frame. The historical basis of comparison will be the postwar 1945-1948 period, when the essential shape of European security developed. For both periods, an effort will be made to highlight the principal factors which affected or will likely affect eventual outcomes. Ultimately, a contrast and comparison of factors from both periods will be made to gain some insight into the unfolding future.

Regarding source material, the information for the post-World War II period comes mainly from the author's graduate thesis entitled "The Evolution of Strategy: Britain and the United States, 1945-1948." Source material for the thesis came from primary and secondary works and memoirs and particularly from extensive military and diplomatic archival records in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. For the

current period, sources are obviously more fluid in nature and include greater reliance on periodicals and journals, newspapers, speeches, official publications, and interviews with public officials and academicians. The curriculum of the NATO Defense College, at which the author has recently studied, has been of special benefit in providing insight into European and American views on the subject. Academic lectures associated with the curriculum and official briefings from each NATO country, most in conjunction with visits to each country, have provided a better understanding of the dynamics existing on both sides of the Atlantic. While the scope and depth of this paper is limited, the international nature of the NATO Defense College and its curriculum has definitely assisted in broadening the perspective of the author.

The examination of such a current and rapidly moving topic cannot claim to be either definitive or even up-to-date. Specific events are occurring almost daily which have some bearing on the topic, and there is no claim to offer the best source of current information for this subject. The principal aim is to present and analyze categories of major factors and through historical comparison shed some light on how the issues will be decided. Limitations and shortcomings are readily acknowledged, but this does not detract from the need to understand how an issue of great relevance to both the United States and Europe will develop in the coming years.

## INTRODUCTION

### DIFFERENT ERAS, SIMILAR CHALLENGES

1945 and 1990--both years represented times of amazing accomplishment and yet tremendous uncertainty regarding the future. There is no doubt that these years will be seen in history as defining moments when change in the international environment led to new directions, challenges and opportunities. For the critical subject of European security, this is particularly true. Along with 1815 and 1918, 1945 and 1990 mark the beginning of postwar eras which, for better or worse, altered the nature and extent of "security" in Europe and indirectly throughout the world.

Given the vast changes that have taken place since the end of World War II, it may seem somewhat of an exaggeration to place 1990 alongside 1945 as a time of similar change. Indeed, the world in 1990 has undergone significant developments since 1945 in science and technology, communications, medicine, and even in the political and demographic landscapes. Moreover, no one would argue that the challenges facing the world at the end of the century are different in nature and scope from those faced at mid-century.

Regarding the question of European security, however, there are still many striking similarities between 1945 and 1990, both in the nature of the European security environment and the role of the United States in that security.

Both 1945 and 1990 marked the end of successful coalition wars--World War II and the Cold War--fought globally but with Europe as the principal battleground and objective. At the end of these wars, the victors faced the problems and challenges of their success. Many of these problems would be the normal characteristics of other postwar periods when the old security environment had been destroyed or collapsed and a new one needed to be established. 1945 and 1990 began periods of transition in the international order when a clear and present threat that had unified the coalition no longer existed. For 1945 that was the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan; for 1990 that was the collapse of the Soviet European empire. The loss of a clear unifying threat placed great stress on the coalition structures that had developed to meet them--the Grand Alliance of World War II, and NATO in the Cold War. Corresponding to the collapse of unifying threats came strong domestic pressures to reduce military establishments that grew up in response to those threats. The rapid military demobilization in the West after World War II had its counterpart in rapid and uncoordinated military force reductions which would begin even before a formal arms reduction treaty was signed in late 1990.

While the major threat seemed to be gone in 1945 and again in 1990, there arose on the horizon a variety of other

potential threats or dangers to future security and order. In 1945 these future threats came in the form of nationalist pressures in the remaining colonial empires, revolutions and civil wars in places like Yugoslavia and Greece, pressures and strife for national identity and independence in the Middle East, and economic hardships and demands of reconstruction. In 1990 the future threats appeared to come from ethnic and nationalist unrest in Central and Eastern Europe, to include the Soviet Union, unreconciled differences and independence movements in the Middle East, and economic hardships and demands of restructuring and incorporating failed systems.

There were, of course, significant differences in 1990, particularly with the new concerns for the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, but on the whole the future threats were remarkably similar in their nature. One rather striking contrast of the two periods centered on the issue of Germany. 1945 brought its division and the beginning of a period where the "German issue" was a major source of East-West friction and rivalry. 1990, on the other hand, brought the formal reunification of Germany and beginning of a difficult process of integration. For both periods, however, Germany stands as a central element in the European security environment.

At both postwar turning points, 1945 and 1990, the changing nature of the threats contributed greatly to uncertainties regarding the future of European security--both the requirements and the means needed to achieve it. Additionally, the question of the American role in that

security likewise stood as one of the compounding uncertainties ahead.<sup>1</sup> The future American role in European security was far from predetermined in 1945, as will be seen later in the paper. The nature of that role and of the European security system evolved over several years into the shape it ultimately took throughout most of the Cold War. Why and how the American role in Europe developed in the post-World War II period relates importantly to the similar reexamination of the American role that began anew in 1990.

The issue of America's role in European security has become increasingly relevant since the defining year of 1990. Open questions of that role have been raised on both sides of the Atlantic, and the issue is far from being definitely resolved in mid-1991. Just as in the post-World War II period, the current questions also address the nature of the security requirements, the respective tasks of nations and institutions, and the political and economic objectives and means available. While these questions are being addressed in the present era of "postwar" transition, it is timely to review how the similar process played out after 1945.

In the post-World War II period, the security environment and crucial decision-making occurred over a period of roughly three years, 1945-1948. By the end of 1948 and early 1949, the shape of America's role in European security had been determined. Later events, especially the Korean War, would provide impetus to further definition of the American commitment, but these only built upon a foundation clearly established in the 1940s. During the early 1990s, a similar

process of foundation-building will occur as Americans and Europeans come to grips with their security requirements and their respective relationships.

Numerous factors influenced the evolution of the American role in European security following 1945, and the same will hold true in the 1990s. External and internal pressures and events within Europe, the United States, and elsewhere in the world will have an impact on what decisions are made by respective governments and institutions. This brings up an important observation regarding these decisions. A combination of realities, forces, and events in history serve to define and limit the options available at any time, but ultimately it is left to human decisions to make the choices that actually move governments and people into action.<sup>2</sup> Human perceptions, therefore, of objective realities are quite critical in influencing policies and decisions and must be incorporated into the consideration of factors.

Besides just addressing the factors involved in influencing the evolution of America's role in post-World War II Europe as well as in present day Europe, an effort will be made to analyze and discriminate the relative degree of importance of these factors. Such an analysis will also seek to compare and contrast the principal factors in the 1945-1948 period with those identified for the early 1990s. Historical comparisons of this nature cannot assure future success, but they can at least improve comprehension of the present and assist with the difficult task of human decision-making which eventually molds the future.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interest," Survival, Vol. 32 (1), January, February 1991, pp. 3-17.

2. Vojtech Mastny, "The Nineteen-Nineties as History," SAIS Review, Vol. 10 (1), Winter-Spring 1990, p. 13.



## CHAPTER I

### POST-WORLD WAR II CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, 1945-1948

#### 1945: Withering of an Alliance

"The alliance between Great Britain and the United States, forged in the fire of necessity, was the most successful Grand Alliance in History."<sup>1</sup> This description of the British-American coalition in World War II accurately describes an unprecedented political and military alliance of two states joined in waging war against common enemies. War and its associated demands proved a conducive environment for forging an alliance based on mutual interest and necessity. When the heat of battle had subsided, however, the United States and Britain faced a new and even more difficult challenge in adjusting their future relations with each other and with a radically changed world. A similar situation was even more true in regard to the respective relationship with the other member of the "Big Three" wartime coalition, the Soviet Union, whose bonds with its coalition partners were never very formal or strong.

The wartime coalition between the United States and Britain had its origin in political and military contacts

which occurred before Pearl Harbor. Mutual political confidence and common interests at the highest levels led to British-American military conversations between January and March 1941, during which a tentative war plan "ABC-1" was outlined giving priority to the defeat of Germany and assigning strategic responsibilities. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the links were formally cemented at the Washington (ARCADIA) Conference between late December 1941 and mid-January 1942.<sup>2</sup>

Out of the Washington Conference developed the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CSS) system, whose purpose was to translate the political alliance into action through actual machinery for strategy formulation and day-to-day management of the war. The CSS, consisting of American and British Chiefs of Staff, met formally as a body only at periodic conferences, and the CSS functioned normally through weekly meetings in Washington of respective representatives. The CSS also included a combined secretariat, a small planning staff, and eventually a number of combined committees to coordinate American and British planning and cooperation. Largely due to the creation of the CSS, the Americans in 1942 established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) organization in order to provide a common front for dealing with British planners.<sup>3</sup>

The formal CSS structure for implementing the wartime alliance worked because of a determination at the highest political levels by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill to overcome traditional differences and cooperate to defeat their common enemies. Besides this

essential political unity, the relative strengths of both countries in 1941-1942 made such a coalition desirable and practical.' Britain and the United States stood relatively equal in their initial contributions, with the British having the military experience and better organization, and the Americans having the enormous potential in manpower and industrial production.<sup>4</sup> By mid-1943 this power balance would change to one of American dominance as American manpower and production expanded. This changing balance caused the British to defer more and more to American leadership, a trend that had considerable impact on strategic decisions and implications for the shape of postwar relations.<sup>5</sup>

British-American strategic planning agreed in the overall objective, but did diverge over the issue of when and where the major blow in Europe would fall. Involvement in the Mediterranean and the exact timing and location of the continental invasion were the major topics of disagreement. British arguments dominated in the 1942 and 1943 strategic decisions of North Africa and Italian invasions. By mid-1943, however, the strategic balance and argument shifted toward an American plan for a cross-channel invasion. Military expediency was always the dominant consideration, though the increased American role significantly influenced the choice of plans.<sup>6</sup>

Differences over strategy during the war between British and American planners can be attributed in large part to differing views of the war. The American concept was of a military effort to defeat Germany as quickly as possible to

release forces for the final attack on Japan; postwar political involvement in Europe was not envisaged. American military authorities, partly due to traditional separation of political and military spheres and partly due to the absence of political guidance, concentrated on military factors alone.<sup>7</sup>

The failure of the United States to consider political ramifications of its military policies cannot, however, be blamed solely on the hesitancy of American military leaders to make political decisions. The American outlook on the war as being foremost a military experience and only secondarily a political concern was characteristic of both the military and civilian leaders. President Roosevelt's guidance on postwar policy to the JCS in November 1943 demonstrated his emphasis on minimizing American political involvement in Europe. He told his advisers that "We should not be roped into accepting any European sphere of influence."<sup>8</sup> Given this presidential guidance and coupled with a suspicion of British attempts to link political and military objectives in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, American military leaders continued to pursue the most expedient courses of action.

British-American differences in viewpoint did not prevent the coalition from accomplishing its wartime objectives; in fact, the degree of cooperation and unity of effort shown exceeded that of any previous wartime alliance between two sovereign states.<sup>9</sup> The differences did reveal, however, that postwar relations, without the stimulus of a common enemy, could not continue on the same close terms as those of the

wartime coalition. American and British attitudes toward postwar cooperation gradually diverged as the war drew to an end.

Different British and American visions of the postwar world also shaped their attitudes toward the future of Anglo-American relations in the postwar era. These differences were reflected in the views of the two leaders. Churchill tended to think simultaneously in both military and political terms, while Roosevelt compartmentalized the two. Churchill had a traditional power politics and regional view of the postwar world; Roosevelt had a global and idealistic view.<sup>10</sup> During the war these differences could be subordinated, but toward the war's end the basic differences began to affect relations.

At the August 1943 Quebec Conference, Churchill accepted in principle Roosevelt's postwar plan for a single international organization with the "Big Four" of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China providing the leadership for worldwide collective security. This was a surrender of Churchill's earlier hopes for regional security groups, though he still supported close postwar relations with the United States, to include continuation of formal military ties.<sup>11</sup>

American policy in 1944-1945 did not reciprocate the British desire for postwar intimacy. Both at Teheran in late 1943 and again at Yalta in February 1945, Roosevelt attempted to win Stalin's confidence by acting more as a mediator. He made every effort to avoid the impression of a secret United States combination with Britain against the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup>

Roosevelt's stated desire to stay out of Europe's internal affairs also conflicted with Churchill's hope that the Americans would remain involved as a balance to Soviet power in Europe.<sup>13</sup> While British-American relations remained close, there was no indication of an American intention to move into a postwar alliance with Britain.

In its military relations, the United States also showed great reluctance to continue the close wartime ties in the postwar period. At Yalta, Churchill expressed the hope for continued functioning of the CSS for three or four years. Roosevelt would only admit that many matters, such as bases, would affect both countries. At Potsdam in July 1945, President Truman told Admiral Leahy that the question of a military alliance with the British should not be brought up "until our relations with our allies became sufficiently stabilized...."<sup>14</sup>

From the British perspective, close military collaboration with the United States appeared desirable due to the relative decline of British power as well as their sensitivity to maintaining a balance of power on the continent. For the United States, such close collaboration no longer seemed necessary because of the absence of any common enemy as well as the hopes for global cooperation and collective security. As a result, by the end of 1945 the CSS effectively ceased to function, and no system of military cooperation or planning had been established. The Grand Alliance of wartime years had vanished.

Concrete actions taken by the United States served to

give clear evidence of the interest to dismantle the Grand Alliance. In June 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee limited British access to aeronautical research information to that which could be used in the war against Japan and excluded that with postwar development significance.<sup>15</sup> In September 1945, the JCS excluded all long-range research and development projects from military information disclosed to the British.<sup>16</sup> Likewise in the area of economic assistance, American steps were to end wartime cooperation. In September 1945 President Truman called for early abolition of wartime combined boards. Even more significant was Truman's move in August to end the Lend-Lease program, to be softened somewhat by year's end with an interest-bearing American loan.

Wartime cooperation on atomic energy, which had begun in June 1942 and culminated in the atomic bomb in 1945, also became a subject of postwar friction. Wartime promises by Roosevelt of "full collaboration" after the war had evolved into vague promises of cooperation and a new focus on an international commission by late 1945. Here again, actions provided the real clue to the substance of relations. The bonds cemented in wartime had weakened measurably in the uncertain environment of peace.

The demise of the British-American Grand Alliance in 1945 has to be seen within the wider context of the postwar world and European security environment in a state of flux. War's end created a strategic revolution, with the territorial influence of the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States

meeting in every corner of the world.<sup>17</sup> The three wartime Allies faced the problem of filling the vacuum, while at the same time readjusting their relationships with each other. Military realities were reflected approximately by the creation of respective occupation zones at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945.<sup>18</sup> During the remainder of 1945 and for years thereafter, the three nations struggled to modify, expand or finalize these early divisions of responsibility. In the immediate postwar years, it was this continuing search for stability between adjoining areas of influence that led to the destruction of the tripartite wartime cooperation and eventually to the revitalization of British-American relations.

By the end of 1945, neither Britain nor the United States had given up hopes for the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Problem areas began to surface, however, almost immediately after the war ended. Iran was one such trouble-spot when occupying Soviet troops interfered with Iranian efforts to put down insurrections in northern Azerbaijan. Both Britain and the United States made formal protests to the Soviet Union over what appeared to be a real and serious threat to Iran.<sup>19</sup> Iran lodged a formal complaint in the United Nations Security Council, and the issue would flair up again in 1946.

Another major issue in late 1945 was over Turkey and the Dardanelles. Soviet demands to Turkey in mid-1945 for territorial concessions and base rights again presented an issue where Britain and the United States became alarmed



regarding Soviet intentions.<sup>20</sup> For this issue, like Iran, British interests appeared the major object of Soviet pressures. American perceptions of the potential Soviet threat were similar, but there was no active attempt at coordinating British and American responses.

Britain and the United States were not without their own sources of friction at this time. A major issue was that of Palestine and the future of a Jewish homeland. American domestic pressure, supported strongly by President Truman, favoring increased Jewish immigration into Palestine ran up against Britain's responsibility for Palestine and its dilemma of satisfying Arab interests in the region along with Jewish and American appeals for a new policy. The issue persisted as a source of ill feeling in the postwar period between Britain and the United States, just as the modern Arab-Israeli issue continues to divide American and European policies and opinions.

While these international issues were surfacing after the war, the major domestic pressure in both the United States and Britain was for a return to prewar normalcy and a rapid demobilization of the vast wartime machines. Public demands for "bringing the boys home" in the United States coupled with lack of a prewar legacy of worldwide involvement and security interests resulted in a rapid demobilization rate.<sup>21</sup> In Britain the legacy of a colonial empire and overseas defense commitments inhibited the pace of demobilization initially. Domestic political pressure would increase, however, even from Winston Churchill, now an opposition leader, and the extent of

America's demobilization effort helped step up British plans for their reductions.

British military readjustments after the war had the additional pressure of the demands for economic rehabilitation. As a result of six years of war, Britain finished the war in a far worse economic position than it had started with. Effects of this tremendous drain were not fully perceived yet, but in reality Britain was no longer a world power, rather a power with world interests. This reality would soon face Britain and the United States as well in the coming years.

Overall, at the end of 1945 the United States had no clear-cut policy toward Europe and no apparent intent to maintain a formal American commitment or "entangling alliance" in the postwar era. The desire not to confront the Soviet Union was still strong, though obvious conflicts of interest were already developing.<sup>22</sup> European, namely British, desires to retain American involvement in security relationships had met with a cool response from across the Atlantic. The demise of common threats had effectively ended the wartime Grand Alliance.

#### 1946: Period of Transition

Beginning in early 1946 and through early 1947, American and British policies developed amidst the harsh realities of power politics and strategic threats. This period marked a noticeable transition from postwar hopes for international cooperation to the fears and mistrust of international

competition. Attitudes toward European security and the potential American role also began to undergo new thinking as well.

The period February-March 1946 marked a major shift in American-Soviet relations. Before this time the greatest danger of a major power confrontation appeared to be between Britain and the Soviet Union. The illusion of a neutral position for the United States was soon dispelled by events. The first event was an aggressive speech by Marshall Joseph Stalin in early February which portended increasingly adverse relations with its former Western Allies. His emphasis on the incompatibility of communism and capitalism, his boasting of Soviet strength, and his neglect of the Western Allies' war efforts or any mention of the United Nations were taken as ominous warnings of future relations. A week following this speech came news of the arrest in Canada of a Soviet spy ring involved in stealing atomic secrets. For America in particular this came as a psychological shock and a rude awakening to the potential dangers from the Soviet Union.<sup>23</sup>

Private and public statements in the United States were now reflecting a different tone toward the Soviet Union and its intentions. On February 22, 1946, American charge d'affaires in Moscow, George Kennan, sent a cable to the State Department which analyzed Soviet motives. In his view the Soviets saw coexistence with capitalism as impossible. He felt that the United States could not reduce Soviet hostility to the West, but only resist their attempts to threaten the West and mainly hope for eventual internal changes. This

telegram reflected disillusionment with "appeasing" the Soviets and a receptivity towards a new approach.<sup>24</sup> Coupled with this diplomatic doubt was also a growing domestic call, from such leaders as Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, for a tougher American response to Soviet policies.<sup>25</sup>

Two important public speeches in February 1946 also reflected a growing Western reappraisal of Soviet intentions. On February 28, Secretary of State James Byrnes indirectly criticized Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, indicating a toughening American policy. Shortly after this speech, Winston Churchill in a speech in Fulton, Missouri, spoke of an "iron curtain" that had fallen across Europe. He supported the United Nations, but said that peace would not be effective without military strength. Churchill also made an appeal for the "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples" and re-echoed the call for continuance of the British-American coalition.<sup>26</sup>

Churchill's speech helped provide a gauge of attitudes in the United States and Britain regarding current limits of policy. Within the United States, there was public disassociation from the speech as well as public criticism of the danger of undermining efforts of the United Nations. A tougher policy toward the Soviet Union was widely accepted, but there was still strong reluctance of implementing it through close ties with Britain.<sup>27</sup>

In Britain the Labor government took no official position on the speech. A large group of Labor parliamentarians, however, reacted strongly against any proposal for an alliance

with the United States as being dangerous to the cause of world peace. The Left Wing of the Labor Party continued to exert considerable pressure against close American ties, and only later would Soviet and American actions cause a change in this skepticism.<sup>28</sup>

International events and crises in 1946 reinforced increasing American and British suspicions of Soviet actions. Soviet reluctance to withdraw its troops from Iran led to strong British and American protests before the issue was eventually resolved in the United Nations. The crisis revealed the common interests of Britain and the United States based upon strategic and political considerations related to the concern over expansion of Soviet power. British and American policies were not coordinated, but the perception of a common interest made future coordination appear more likely.<sup>29</sup>

Iran did not produce a British-American alignment against the Soviet Union, but another more important issue would-- Germany. Both the United States and Britain were interested in treating Germany as a single economic unit, as stipulated in the Potsdam protocol. By the summer of 1946, British and American interests in Germany became obvious when the United States offered to unite the American zone economically with any or all other zones. Only the British accepted, with economic self-interest to reduce the burden of occupation being a large factor. French opposition to a centralized and resurgent Germany had initially been a concern, but suspicions of Soviet intentions were becoming more prominent.<sup>30</sup> In a

September 1946 speech, Secretary of State Byrnes reiterated support for economic unity in Germany, but he also warned that the United States would not accept Germany becoming the "satellite of any power." Byrnes went on to pledge an American commitment "to remain in Germany for a long period." Such statements showed a growing determination of American policy to oppose Soviet expansion in Germany.<sup>31</sup>

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin reacted to the Byrnes' speech by stressing that "the continuance of American interest in Europe is vital to the peace of Europe and particularly to the future of Germany."<sup>32</sup> The United States was slowly moving towards active support of European security in opposition to potential Soviet expansion, and the British eagerly welcomed American involvement. For Britain and the United States, mutual interest over the German issue proved to be the touchstone of future cooperation.

Though the German issue would be of the greatest long-range importance for the United States and Britain, events in the Eastern Mediterranean caused the most concern in 1946. Soviet demands to Turkey for bases in the straits raised serious doubts about Soviet intentions. For the United States at the time, the concern over Soviet expansion in the region was primarily that of the danger of conflict between the Soviets and the British, to whom the region was of vital interest. The potential elimination of British influence and power was considered a real threat, and thus American and British interests coincided over the nature of Soviet policy.<sup>33</sup>

American concerns over the Soviet demands reflected an attitude of avoiding the dangers of "appeasement" of a powerful nation, a lesson recently learned in World War II. The extent of American concern was visibly expressed in August 1946 by the dispatch of a sizable naval force to the region. This was the first of many similar exercises of such "diplomatic" expression in the Cold War era. The United States by now saw Turkey as "the most important military factor" in the Middle and Near East. British interests were seen as being at greater direct risk, but Soviet dominance in the region was also viewed as an important danger to American interests.

The crisis over Turkey, combined with a shooting incident in Yugoslavia in August 1946 in which an American transport plane was shot down, increased concerns over diminished military capabilities in Europe and the need for greater coordination between Britain and the United States. In late August 1946, British and American military planners met in Washington to discuss contingency actions in case of an emergency. These talks represented the first tentative steps toward closer military cooperation and the first time since late 1945 that military representatives were discussing mutual problems. Perception of an increasingly expansionist Soviet policy was the immediate catalyst for these discussions. These contacts fell far short of a military alliance or commitment, but they did reflect the practical implications of a growing commonality of interests.<sup>34</sup>

British-American cooperation was not without problems,

however. In the area of atomic energy, the United States refused to provide the sharing of information the British sought, and the McMahon Bill in August 1946 severely restricted future exchanges to the point that Britain would later choose to proceed with its own separate atomic weapons program. The "special relationship" of later years was clearly not present in 1946.<sup>35</sup>

Serious differences over the Palestine issue also continued to divide Britain and the United States. Truman's support for creation of a new Jewish state conflicted with British interests in preserving Arab friendship and access to Arab oil. Ill-feelings over this issue did not seem to affect overall relations, but it does highlight the irritating nature of different perspectives that existed.<sup>36</sup>

In the realm of military policies and planning, a number of important trends can be discerned. British overseas commitments continued unabated in 1946 as did its active involvement in world affairs. Specific commitment to European defense, however, was uncertain, though there was a widespread belief that no effective defense of Western Europe would be possible without American support from the beginning, support which remained a major question mark.<sup>37</sup> By this time, British military studies had come to view the Soviet Union as Britain's only foreseeable enemy. These military views, however, did not correspond to government pronouncements where Britain could claim to avoid "tying herself to anyone" and remain "miding" between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>38</sup> This dichotomy between military and political



statements regarding the Soviet Union also existed in the United States as well.

By late 1946 the stage was being set in Britain for a readjustment of overseas commitments. Stalemate in India foreshadowed an end to British rule there in the near future, a decision to be announced in February 1947. British withdrawals from Greece, even while a guerrilla war threatened to expand there, demonstrated a waning commitment. This reduction, in particular, indicated growing pressures of economic and financial considerations on British defense policy. Budget deficits and problems of economic recovery began to exert serious influence on defense policy and spending. There was an obvious need to establish priorities for diminishing resources for domestic and defense requirements. These looming financial and economic problems facing Britain would soon lead to a drastic reshaping of British commitments and eventually to closer ties with the United States.<sup>39</sup>

For the United States, domestic politics and budgetary constraints took priority in 1946 as the military services began postwar readjustment. In contrast to diminishing military power, however, was a growing concern over the need to resist Soviet policies. Presidential adviser Clark Clifford went so far in a September 1946 report to argue that the United States "should be prepared...to resist vigorously and successfully any efforts of the U.S.S.R. to expand into areas vital to American security."<sup>40</sup>

Military planning assumptions in 1946 also began to

mirror changing perceptions about the Soviet Union. It was now considered "our probable principal opponent," while at the same time assuming Britain and its Commonwealth would "probably be our Allies in the event of a major war."<sup>41</sup> Both views reflected the changing nature of international relations. State Department input to the military planning process at this time also revealed such influence. In a top secret State Department memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the present course of Soviet foreign policy was seen as a source of potential disaster. While claiming that there was "no special policy" by the United States, the memorandum said the entire focus of American policy would be to check the physical extension of Soviet power. Recognizing American "military ineffectiveness within the land masses of Eurasia," it also stressed the special importance of Britain and other non-Soviet countries in regard to opposing Soviet expansion. In order to deny Soviet hegemony of Europe, Britain "must continue in existence as the principal power in Western Europe economically and militarily."<sup>42</sup> At this time Britain was seen as the major check to possible Soviet expansion in Europe.

Looking back on developments in 1946, it becomes obvious that important transitions were occurring in British and American strategic thinking. The primary stimulus for these changes can be traced to their perceptions of Soviet policy. Events in Iran, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Germany led to strong suspicions of what was considered as expansionist Soviet policy. As a result of these perceptions, the United States became more involved in areas such as the Near and

Middle East and identified the Soviet Union as its one probable enemy. This latter action served to increase the emphasis on Britain's role as an ally in the event of war. Once again, a potential threat served to solidify interests, even though military cooperation was still far from assured. The beginning of 1947 brought ill foreboding for Britain's future role as a major power, and both she and the United States stood on the threshold of serious reevaluations of their world roles.

#### 1947: New Challenges and New Directions

During the first eighteen months of the postwar period, Britain had continued to assume the role and responsibilities of major power. With approximately 500,000 troops deployed overseas in various occupation and peacekeeping duties, Britain maintained her influence and status in international affairs. By early 1947, however, the delayed effects of the war on Britain's economy, combined with a devastating winter, threatened to curtail the commitments that had been doggedly retained. In February 1947 the true nature of Britain's weakened position became clear to all, especially the United States. A major reduction in British overseas commitments would soon create a dilemma on how to fill the ensuing vacuum. For the United States, this called for a serious reevaluation of national policy as it found itself thrust into a position of leadership and responsibility in an increasingly turbulent world. 1947 would see the adjustment to new realities on both sides of the Atlantic.

By January and February 1947, it had become obvious that the British empire and Britain's role as a world power were coming to an end. The decision in January to give Burma its independence, the Cabinet decision in mid-February to refer the Palestine dispute to the United Nations, and the announcement on February 20 of the British intention to withdraw from India reflected a major retrenchment in British commitments. Of even more immediate strategic and political importance, however, was the British notification to the United States in late February of her inability to continue financial and military assistance to Greece and Turkey. The British decision to cease aid to Greece and Turkey can be traced primarily to serious domestic economic and financial problems, aggravated by costs associated with a severe winter. The problem areas were not unfamiliar to the Americans, but the immediacy and extent of Britain's aid reductions came as a surprise.<sup>43</sup>

American awareness of the strategic importance of the Near East had been demonstrated in the crises of 1946, and there was already a strong interest in checking Soviet expansion in this area. British abdication of responsibility was still a shock, and it created a crisis atmosphere in the American government. There was virtual unanimity that the United States would have to step into the void if Soviet expansion was to be checked. The choice presented to Truman by his advisers was clear: intervene directly with American aid, or face the likely loss of Greece and Turkey. Not surprisingly, Truman chose to intervene.<sup>44</sup>

Briefings to American Congressional leaders at this time were revealing of the government's attitude. Essentially the argument for aid was that a Soviet breakthrough in Greece or Turkey could endanger the Middle East and eventually France and Italy, where Communist parties had a strong foothold. Aid was essential to American security, it was argued, not just to help the British.<sup>45</sup> The argument was convincing, and American action came on March 12, 1947 when President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress. In his request for financial aid for Greece and Turkey, he also made the sweeping pronouncement that "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." Such support, however, "should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes." This commitment came later to be known as the Truman Doctrine, and it marked a dramatic turning point in American foreign policy.<sup>46</sup>

While this new American commitment sounded ambitious in 1947, it was still primarily economic in its instruments and did not carry a military commitment. In fact the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the United States had no alternative to offset a British troop withdrawal from Greece, even though such a withdrawal threatened America's strategic position in the area.<sup>47</sup> American pressure did succeed in persuading the British to retain 5,000 troops in Greece until 1948. Thus, while America's new policy had military implications, there was still an obvious lack of the means or will to fulfill any

new commitment.

The new American policy taking shape in 1947 became known eventually as "containment." At this stage economic weaknesses were the primary focus, not only in Britain, Greece, and Turkey, but throughout the whole of Europe. In the spring of 1947, separate American efforts had begun which converged in June in a proposal for extensive American aid to address these economic problems--the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program, grew out of a variety of motives and pressures and did not evolve from any single policy objective. American generosity, economic self-interest, strategic considerations, and bureaucratic pressures all contributed to its final form. Ultimately, however, it was the American desire to reinvigorate the German economy, to assist other European countries in overcoming their economic problems, and to forestall political instability in Western Europe that finally brought the Marshall Plan into existence.<sup>48</sup> It is important to note, however, that Marshall, in his speech proposing the plan, said that the initiative for specific programs must come from Europe. A similar American interest would later be evident regarding security matters as well.

The Marshall plan had little if any military significance at the time it originated in 1947. It was a strong American commitment to European recovery and stability, and in that sense it had important strategic implications. The overall importance that the United States attached to Western Europe can be seen in other documents of the period. For example, a

JCS memorandum in April 1947 stated that Western Europe, including Britain, was the area "of primary strategic importance" to the United States.<sup>49</sup> Other areas in their order of importance were the Middle East, Northwest Africa, Latin American, and the Far East. The independence of Britain and France was considered of first importance to American national security and "inseparable" with the defense of the United States and Canada.<sup>49</sup> This explicit identification of the importance of Western Europe helps explain a large part of the motivation behind the Marshall Plan. Strategic considerations intermingled with the economic objectives of the plan and foreshadowed the subsequent security developments of 1948.

While 1947 denoted the beginning of the end for Britain's role as world power, the transition from great power status to that of another European country came at a relatively gradual pace. Substantial troop withdrawals were still mostly in the future, and Britain still devoted 9.5% of her gross national product to defense in 1947, compared to about 6% for the United States. Sizable defense cuts were projected for the future, but in 1947 British responsibilities and commitments still exceeded those of the United States.<sup>50</sup> By this time, however, financial considerations were becoming the decisive factor in British defense planning, and clear future trends were becoming impossible to escape.

In 1947 uncertainty persisted regarding British military commitment to the European continent. A treaty of alliance with France, signed at Dunkirk in March, represented mainly a safeguard against the renewal of German militarism, but it

looked more to the past than the future and had little military significance. At this time military cooperation with France would have been difficult since Communists were still in the French government. By year's end , military cooperation between Britain and France appeared more desirable and preliminary talks did begin in January 1948. Throughout 1947, however, the British military had no clear strategic concept for the defense of Western Europe.<sup>51</sup>

For the United States in 1947, domestic priorities governed and budgets controlled military policy. War was viewed as unlikely, and demobilization continued at a rapid pace. Evidence of the state of American military unpreparedness came in April 1947 when President Truman was advised of the practically non-existent state of the so-called atomic arsenal of the United States. This would begin to change, however, by the end of 1947 as renewed interest in improving this arsenal coincided with the deterioration in international relations.<sup>52</sup>

Worsening economic conditions in Europe in 1947 carried over into American strategic planning. The continuing stalemate in negotiations with the Soviet Union heightened concerns over the future stability and reliability of potential allies. Britain's position, in particular, became the subject of widespread discussion throughout 1947. Her deteriorating economic and domestic political position during 1947 cast serious doubts about Britain's reliability. A fear frequently expressed was that economic and political constraints in Britain might force her to pursue policies



ultimately harmful to American interests.<sup>53</sup> While political and military considerations in 1947 contributed to overall doubts about Britain as an ally, in the area of military coordination there was a continuation of informal talks. In this situation the incentives for military coordination served to maintain close contacts until such time as the political doubts could be removed.<sup>54</sup>

American doubts about potential allies were not limited to Britain. Military planning assumptions in 1947, in fact, considered Britain as the only European country likely to provide "active support" in the event of war. This lack of confidence in other European countries could probably be attributed to serious doubts about their political and economic stability as well as their vulnerability to Soviet military power.<sup>55</sup>

For the United States, 1947 was a year of dramatic new initiatives in foreign policy. The development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan confirmed an expanding American involvement in world affairs in the shadow of what was perceived to be an expansionist Soviet Union. American military policy, however, was slower to adapt as domestic economic pressures continued to reduce budgets and forces. Britain, at the same time, had begun a gradual retrenchment in her overseas commitments and experienced growing financial and political pressures to reappraise future policies. At the beginning of 1948, both countries faced a reconsideration of their military policies and commitments in light of international realities and changing foreign policies.

### 1948: Toward a Mutual Defense

The waning months of 1947 witnessed the seemingly permanent split between the Soviet Union and its former Western allies over the future of Germany. During 1948 this split became unalterable as both sides moved to solidify their own positions in the face of perceived threats. For the United States and Britain, 1948 became a period of dramatic steps toward achieving a unity of policy and effort that had not previously existed in peacetime. As their respective foreign policies evolved in the atmosphere of growing East-West confrontation, defense policies and military strategy underwent adjustments that would shape the future course of postwar relations and particularly the nature of America's commitment to European security.

With the failure of the London Foreign Ministers Conference in December 1947, Western leaders turned their attention to closer cooperation among themselves. In mid-December, soon after the conference ended, British Foreign Minister Bevin raised the issue of European security with Secretary of State Marshall. Bevin suggested the need to "devise some western democratic system" that would include Britain, the United States, the countries of Western Europe, and the Dominions.<sup>56</sup> His idea was not of a formal alliance, but rather of a "spiritual federation of the west." Western Europe's security would have to be considered, especially given French concern over the subject, and the main task would be to create confidence in Europe that Communist expansion could be stopped. Marshall expressed no criticism of the

proposal, but he withheld definite approval of a specific course of action. The seed of a new policy had been planted, and specifics would be soon in coming.

After consulting with French Foreign Minister Bidault, Bevin took the initial step toward formation of a "Western Union." In early January 1948, he informed Marshall of his intent to launch "some form of union in Western Europe...to mobilize political as well as economic forces to halt the Soviet threat." Bevin said he would propose that Britain and France offer Dunkirk-type treaties to the Benelux countries. He felt the time was ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe, and the lead for such a project would have to come initially from Britain.<sup>57</sup>

Bevin's initiative for the formation of a Western Union struck a responsive chord in the United States. Marshall, with Truman's authorization, assured Bevin of "wholehearted sympathy" and promised to assist in bringing the project to fruition.<sup>58</sup> At this stage, however, American participation remained an open question.

On January 22, 1948, Bevin's plans became public in an address to the House of Commons. He reviewed the background of Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, Greece, the Near East, and the "obstruction" on the German issue. He said the Marshall Plan had brought the issue to a head, and that the need existed for further organization and consolidation of Western Europe. Reflecting Britain's deeper involvement in European affairs, Bevin said that "Britain cannot stand outside Europe and regard her problems as quite separate from

those of her European neighbours."<sup>59</sup> The speech marked a firm political commitment by the British government to the security of Western Europe.

While America's role in the proposed Western Union remained uncertain, pressures soon developed for active support. Bevin and the British Ambassador in Washington made strong suggestions to State Department officials on the need for American support and participation. The reaction was that the initiative was with the Europeans themselves, as it had been with the European Recovery Program.<sup>60</sup> Overall, the United States was supportive, but hesitant to commit itself.

In February and March 1948, events transpired which injected a new sense of urgency into the movement for a common defense in Western Europe. The first shock came in late February in Czechoslovakia, where on the eve of their elections, a Communist coup managed to solidify control of the last remaining country in Eastern Europe with any semblance of a democratic government.<sup>61</sup> This action caused a wave of indignation and anger in Western governments and spurred efforts to offset further Communist expansion in Europe. French Foreign Minister Bidault, in an urgent message to Marshall, said the time had come to apply efforts similar to those of economic reconstruction to the political and military field.<sup>62</sup>

In the United States, the Czech coup did not immediately alter the view that European initiatives must come first and that European security must rely primarily on economic recovery.<sup>63</sup> In early March, however, a telegram from General

Lucius Clay in Germany caused serious reconsideration. In his telegram Clay warned of a change in Soviet attitudes and his concern that war may come "with dramatic suddenness."<sup>64</sup> This warning caused the American military and State Department to take a grave view of the dangers to Europe. Combined with consideration of the Czech coup, Clay's telegram resulted in a recommendation to renew the draft and augment the military budget for 1949. Additionally, internal State Department recommendations called for possible American membership in a regional defense arrangement with European countries.<sup>65</sup>

One final element of pressure came in an urgent early March communication from Bevin to Marshall. Bevin reported on Soviet demands on Norway for a defense arrangement, and he warned that a bold move was needed to avert Soviet pressures on Europe. Bevin asked for immediate discussions between the United States and Britain on security in the North Atlantic area.<sup>66</sup> The combination of these events and pressures in February and March finally led American leaders to accept the need for engaging in a security program for Western Europe. On March 12, Marshall informed Bevin of his desire "to proceed at once in the joint discussion on the establishment of an Atlantic security system."<sup>67</sup>

The starting point for further efforts came on March 17 when Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, meeting in Brussels, signed a fifty-year treaty of collective self-defense. In the event of an armed attack in Europe on any party, the others would offer all military and other aid in their power. This treaty was the first step in the

coordination of military policies among the countries of Western Europe. That it was only an initial step became obvious in a message from Bevin and Bidault to Marshall the same day saying that the Brussels Treaty was the prerequisite for arrangements that might include the United States.<sup>68</sup>

On the same day the Brussels Treaty was signed, President Truman delivered an important address to Congress. In addition to condemning recent Soviet actions, he responded to events in Brussels by saying: "I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them."<sup>69</sup> Truman gave weight to his words by also asking Congress to reenact Selective Service as well as promptly enact funding for the European Recovery Program.

The Brussels Treaty and Truman's speech indicated a changing attitude among the Western European nations and the United States. Economic instruments of policy that were dominant in 1947 were now giving way to emphasis on political and military cooperation. The unstable and threatening security environment in Europe had raised serious fears on both sides of the Atlantic and focused attention on the issues of European security and military cooperation.

Actions proceeded in the following months in both Europe and the United States toward developing future cooperation. In March top secret meetings were held in Washington between American, British and Canadian representatives on extending a regional security agreement in the North Atlantic area. While not yet official American policy, the movement for such an

arrangement was in progress.<sup>70</sup> Such movement was reinforced by separate British, French, and other European recommendations which stressed the necessity of American support for European security. Discussions were occurring within America as well, in Congress and the National Security Council. The general thrust of American policy at this time, however, remained that Europeans would have to develop their own program for common defense before discussions could occur with the United States.<sup>71</sup>

European actions did proceed in late April when the Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of Brussels Pact countries met in London and agreed on an organization of a permanent Military Committee. In mid-May the Military Committee established principles for concerted European action, including the desire to link European plans with American strategy and force deployments.<sup>72</sup>

In May and June diplomatic and political activities continued with considerable emphasis. In the United States, the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution which supported the association of the United States with collective security arrangements under the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The National Security Council, which had also been studying the issue, recommended to Truman in June that conversations begin in July with European representatives on expanding the Brussels Treaty into a collective security system. By late June 1948, the groundwork had been laid for a defense arrangement that would link the United States and Western Europe. Bevin's initiative in January along with

increased concerns about Soviet expansion had combined to galvanize American and European policies.<sup>73</sup>

Concurrent with progress toward a collective security system, the Western Powers continued to discuss a common solution for the future of Germany. The French initially were reluctant to centralized policies in Germany, but after the Czech coup French cooperation increased and all parties agreed on the need for close coordination among the three Western countries. The Soviets protested these efforts and in March began a program of interference with Western access to Berlin. Despite Soviet efforts, the Western Powers proceeded toward organizing a West German government and by June had reached agreement on the major issues.<sup>74</sup> The consensus on Germany represented a notable achievement in light of previous differences. French concessions, in particular, came hard and reflected the growing concern over security issues. In effect, the French had given in on the German issue to secure American support for a defense system.

During the first six months of 1948, Western attention centered on security issues and the future of Germany. Other potential problems diminished somewhat as the Italian elections in April returned a non-Communist government, and the Greek rebellion weakened as the Yugoslav-Soviet rift helped limit outside support. European security and Germany now stood at the forefront of policy issues, especially for Britain and the United States. Britain's political commitment to Western Europe had been clearly demonstrated, and she had played a crucial role in convincing the United States of



Europe's significance to American security. As security issues increased in prominence, Britain and the United States moved steadily toward a closer political and military partnership.<sup>75</sup>

Within Britain there had been an intense debate and discussion over the nature of British commitment to the continent. By May 1948, however, the government finally accepted arguments for the principle of fighting in Western Europe. This commitment to a "continental strategy" was largely to reassure her Brussels Pact partners, but it was also tied to British-American relations. Throughout the negotiations and diplomatic exchanges of early 1948 over a European defense system, British leaders pressed for active American involvement in the defense of Western Europe. The American precondition for this support of European defense had consisted of proof of Europe's intent to do its part in providing for its own defense. Britain's role in meeting this precondition was essential, and it was also largely through Britain's commitment to a continental defense that a European self-defense system came into existence.<sup>76</sup>

During the spring of 1948, British military representatives attempted to persuade American military leaders of the seriousness of their commitment to European defense. As a result of British initiatives, joint conversations were held in late March over the issue of European security. During these conversations agreement was reached that American, British, and Canadian military planners should begin work on an emergency plan for a war in Europe

against the Soviet Union. These sessions were held in April, and they laid the groundwork for closer military cooperation as well as a new emphasis on continental defense in American strategic planning.<sup>77</sup>

American planning had to be reevaluated in the spring of 1948 in light of the new political support for Western Europe. With the influence of political considerations and the British new-found emphasis on continental defense, American planners revised their emergency war plan in order to reassure European countries of America's intent to support them in their defense efforts. A very important change in planning assumptions had to do with potential allies. France and the Benelux countries were now included as American allies, where previously only Britain had warranted this confidence. For the first time, American military planners acknowledged a potentially useful role for the continental countries.<sup>78</sup>

The major thrust of the changes in the plan had to do with a new emphasis on delaying Soviet advances with occupation forces rather than immediately withdrawing them as the previous plan called for. Estimates of Western capabilities had not changed, these were still very pessimistic, but now there was an "intent" to resist an attack. A further change was a greater stress on Middle East bases, a major factor for which had been British arguments during April talks. This new plan was approved in May by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also accepted by British and Canadian planners as the common basis for their own national plans.<sup>79</sup> In effect, it had been American concessions to

European interests that facilitated the plan's combined adoption.

By June 1948, activities in Western Europe and the United States were pointing to the formation of a regional defense system linking both sides of the Atlantic. In the middle of this process stood Britain, with her renewed commitment to European defense and her increasingly close military ties with the United States. The crisis events of February-March 1948 accelerated American involvement in Europe, but it had been Britain's initiative that made this involvement possible. In the coming weeks, Britain would provide yet another stimulus to cement America's commitment to Europe.

In June 1948, despite the preliminary steps for a common defense for Western Europe, America's specific commitment to Western Europe and the extent of European cooperation remained uncertain. It would take the impact of a crisis in the summer of 1948 to solidify American and European efforts for a common defense. The crisis that would spur Western defense policies developed over the most important postwar issue--Germany.

Western efforts to unify Western Germany led to a final division with the Soviet Union over the German issue. Western currency reforms in late June precipitated a Soviet move on June 24 to halt all rail and road access to West Berlin. This total surface blockade represented a direct challenge to the Western Powers and the most serious postwar test of strength between the Soviet Union and its former wartime allies.

The American government responded to the Soviet actions by initiating an airlift of supplies on June 26. On June 28

President Truman affirmed the intention to remain in Berlin and to supply the city by air. American transport aircraft sent to Germany carried out the bulk of this massive effort, though British aircraft also aided and eventually furnished one-third of the effort. This concerted British-American program finally succeeded in providing the essential supplies to sustain Berlin and break the back of the blockade.<sup>80</sup>

In addition to this airlift, important military responses were also taken which had even greater implications for the future American role and commitment to European security. On June 27, General Clay, the American military governor in Berlin, reported that British officials were urging the dispatch of bombers from the United States to Europe to sustain Western firmness. Clay's report revealed the strong importance attached by the British to American air power as a means of bolstering European morale.<sup>81</sup> Confirmation of this British request was soon made directly by Foreign Minister Bevin, who suggested that such a move of American air combat units would reassure Germans, French and British of American support and also be effective in backing up formal protests to the Soviet Union. This augmentation of military power appeared all the more necessary due to the great preponderance of conventional military power which the Soviets had in Berlin and Germany at the time.<sup>82</sup>

The American response came promptly, and on June 28 Truman ordered immediate dispatch of two B-29 squadrons to bases in Germany. There was more deliberate consideration of the offer of basing bombers in Britain, and confirmation was

sought that the British fully understood the implications of such a move. Such confirmation did come, and on July 15 Truman approved sending two B-29 groups to bases in Britain. The deployment of bombers seemed to offer the most expedient means of backing up a political commitment that was not yet accompanied by a coordinated military policy.<sup>83</sup>

British official reaction to the move was low key, but it was obvious that this action had great significance. Churchill called it a measure "which so far as I know, is unprecedented in times of peace."<sup>84</sup> Prime Minister Clement Attlee later described it as an unpleasant but realistic decision that had to be taken to meet the danger of Soviet expansion. In his view the Berlin crisis and the American response represented a turning point in American policy.<sup>85</sup>

Indeed, the stationing of American bombers in Britain in 1948 did mark both a turning point in American policy and an unprecedented step in peacetime. For the United States the action demonstrated a firm moral commitment to the security of Western Europe. The deployment of strategic bombers to Europe also represented the first major reinforcement of American forces in continental Europe since the end of World War II. For Britain the encouragement and acceptance of American bombers denoted a firm commitment to a political and military alliance with the United States. The result of both American and British actions was the virtual revival of their wartime alliance.<sup>86</sup>

It should be noted that deployment of B-29s to Europe in 1948 was more symbolic in nature than an actual capability.

The bombers that arrived in Britain lacked the capability of carrying atomic bombs, and no provisions had been made for storing atomic weapons overseas. Therefore, the deployment more accurately represented the implied threat of a future capability than the actual threat of an existing capability.<sup>87</sup> Though with obvious differences, the deployment of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe in the early 1980s represented a similar "symbolic" move in response to Soviet missile deployments.

Besides helping to revive closer British-American ties, the Berlin crisis also stimulated action on other fronts related to the development of a common defense system. The impetus of a new Soviet threat provided a further boost to the groundwork laid earlier. On July 2 Truman approved a statement saying the State Department should begin preliminary conversations with interested nations in order to implement the Vandenberg Resolution. Beginning on July 6, exploratory conversations were held in Washington with the ambassadors of Brussels Pact nations and Canada on common security problems. By September a broad outline of the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded, and in December negotiations began on actually drafting the treaty that would culminate with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. The Berlin Blockade had played a large part in speeding the process toward this collective defense agreement which formally tied the United States to Europe's security.<sup>88</sup>

Other related security actions also occurred in this period. In early July the United States sent military

representatives to the Military Committee meetings of the Brussels Treaty, thus signaling an important new American involvement in European security matters. One clear purpose of this American presence was to persuade Brussels Pact countries to proceed with their own planning.<sup>89</sup> Planning activity was also being stepped up in Germany, where efforts were made to coordinate British, American and French plans for their occupation forces.

The issue of command arrangements also arose at this time. It is interesting to note that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, while supportive of the need for an Allied Commander in Chief for Western Europe, preferred that such a commander be British or French. The desire not to have an American commander largely indicated their pessimism over the capability then to conduct any successful conventional defense in Western Europe. While accountability to an overall combined military and political body was seen as essential, there was no expressed requirement that the American commitment to European security necessitated an American theater commander.<sup>90</sup>

The Berlin Blockade and its aftermath had an additional impact on American military assistance. In early July President Truman approved proposals committing the United States to the principle of rearming Western Europe. In September Truman actually approved the equipping of three French divisions. This represented the first major provision of military assistance to Western Europe since the war, and it signalled the seriousness of the American commitment to

European security. In mid-1949 the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was enacted and became a major instrument of support for the North Atlantic security system. While the United States did commit itself to providing military equipment to Western Europe, it should be noted that there was no comparable effort at conducting a major rearmament for American forces. The continuing constraints of budgetary limits helped shape the nature of America's contribution to European security.<sup>91</sup>

American planning underwent some adjustments in late 1948 as a result of the need to reassure the Europeans of American support. By now there was an American commitment, in principle at least, to a continental defense and an air offensive in Europe to retard any Soviet advances. This foreshadowed the "deterrent" strategy that later became the foundation of American and NATO defense policy. By the end of 1948, therefore, the essential elements of America's future role in European security had been developed--a formal commitment through a common defense arrangement, American support of European rearmament, and a strategy linked to America's air power which aimed at deterring further Soviet expansion in Europe.

#### 1945-1948: Evolving Commitment

Looking back at the 1945-1948 period as a whole, it becomes obvious that a complex variety of factors--political, economic and military--were involved in influencing the nature and extent of America's postwar role in Europe. A critical



factor in the immediate postwar period was the absence of a clearly perceived security threat. The defeat of common enemies during the war had effectively caused the early postwar demise of the strong British-American alliance. Without a common threat to unite them, Britain and the United States responded to their perceptions of their own national interests, which often did not appear identical. It took specific international events and crises to refocus attention on elements of common interest, whether in the Near and Middle East or in Europe.

Economic considerations and realities became important factors in the early postwar years. They served to provide additional pressures for demobilization and return to an emphasis on domestic needs in the United States and Europe. For Britain, in particular, the delayed realization of the economic and financial costs of six years of war proved to be significant. By early 1947, Britain's position as a global power was in serious jeopardy due to the tremendous economic and fiscal constraints at home. No longer able to afford the responsibilities of her prewar condition, Britain turned to the United States for assistance. American interests which previously had been indirectly protected through British power now appeared in real danger. The response came initially in 1947 via economic instruments, first with aid to Greece and Turkey and eventually with aid to Europe as the extent of Europe's postwar condition became obvious.

American concern for European economic recovery would not have been as great had it not been also for growing concerns

of what appeared to be expansionist Soviet policies and actions. Inability to agree with the Soviets on common solutions to Germany's future also meant that the German issue would continue to be at the center of economic reconstruction of Europe and its overall stability.

By 1948 Europe's security had become the dominant concern. Europeans themselves perceived the need for action, and at Britain's initiative launched a collective security arrangement culminating in the Brussels Treaty. Specific events, the failure of four-power talks over Germany and the Czech coup, created the need for action. Perceived common interests in ensuring against Soviet expansion would also lead to concessions by the French over Germany in order to gain American support for European efforts at common defense.

A final and decisive impetus for action came from the Berlin crisis in mid-1948. The apparent security threat and common interest was such for the United States that it was willing to provide its first major military reinforcements to Europe since the war. These reinforcements came at British suggestion, and they marked a mutual commitment to the overriding security interest both countries shared.

America's commitment to European security evolved gradually during these postwar years in response to perceived American interests. The overall security environment had been largely shaped by Soviet actions and perceptions of those actions in the West, especially of the need to contain further expansion. The limits of American and European roles and responses were greatly influenced by economics and financial

constraints. For the United States, its specific role became defined only after European initiatives demonstrated that an American role was wanted and had a reasonable chance for success. Broad American policies and capabilities had determined the potential for involvement, but West European action and American perceptions of that action ultimately shaped the specific nature and extent of that involvement.<sup>92</sup>

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## CHAPTER II

### CURRENT AND NEAR-TERM CHALLENGES, 1990-1993

#### Prologue: The Security Environment

1990, similar to 1945, represented one of those rare points in history--the beginning of periods of fundamental and profound change. The year also marked, in the words of President George Bush, "another such moment--a critical time in our strategic relationship with our neighbors across the Atlantic."<sup>1</sup> Few people would debate the validity of the claim that 1990 denoted a beginning of a new area in international relations. Exactly what that era will be, however, is far more debatable and uncertain. To some extent the same can be said of American-European relations, particularly in regard to the future role of the United States in European security. Before proceeding to examine the factors that will influence and shape this future American role, it is useful to review briefly the altered security landscape that 1990 bequeathed to the future.

In summarizing the major influences and trends of 1990, it is important first to acknowledge that 1989 was the year of revolutionary change that became the prelude to the end of the

Cold War in 1990. Within a period of six months in 1989, the countries of Eastern Europe--Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania--repudiated their communist leaders and proclaimed a commitment to democratic politics and market economies. These "peaceful" revolutions effectively ended the Soviet empire in Europe and dramatically altered the political and military shape of the East-West confrontation that had existed since the late 1940s.<sup>2</sup>

The aftermath of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 is an ongoing and rapidly changing process of internal and external readjustments. Democratization and economic restructuring are difficult tasks in the best of circumstances. Combined with the pressures of external political and financial demands and internal redefinitions of nationality and security, the readjustment process is proving very demanding and is likely to continue as such for the foreseeable future. This environment has opened up a new dimension to European security which will be an important factor for all countries involved, including the United States, as they reassess their respective roles and responsibilities.<sup>3</sup>

If the revolutions of 1989 were the prelude, then 1990 marked the climatic year of change. Not surprisingly, the focal point of that change was the same as it had been in the late 1940s--Germany. As was stressed in the previous discussion of the post-World War II era, the German issue became the decisive factor then in shaping the postwar divisions and associations, including finally the American

military commitment to Western Europe's security. The series of steps leading to German reunification on October 3, 1990 can be seen as culminating one era--the Cold War--and opening a new period of transition and change. The emergence of German power and its various uses and misuses has been the central factor in 20th century European history. The division of the country and dispute over its future had been at the heart of Cold War confrontation. Now the reuniting of Germany marked another crossroad in history and a potential turning point for European security.<sup>4</sup>

While dramatic events in Germany and Eastern Europe signalled the end to the Cold War, the real roots of these changes were further east--the Soviet Union. By 1990 it was clear to all to see that the Soviet Union faced a fundamental political and economic crisis which would affect not only its future, but that also of much of Europe. The five years after Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985 witnessed attempts at reforms and restructuring which met with great foreign acclaim, but failed to accomplish their domestic objectives. Not only was the Soviet economy on the verge of collapse in 1990, but the union itself seemed teetering on the brink of dissolution. The Baltic republics' declarations of independence in 1990 were followed by similar pronouncements in several of the other fifteen republics. At the end of 1990, the future of the Soviet Union stood as a troubling question mark which presented challenges for the rest of Europe and the United States as well.<sup>5</sup>

These internal events in the Soviet Union had much to do

with the two major changes in Soviet foreign policy affecting European security: peaceful acquiescence to the loss of communist control in Eastern Europe, and elimination of the Soviet offensive military posture in Europe. Both of these changes can be attributed largely to the demands and constraints of domestic problems, especially the state of the Soviet economy. Whatever the causes of these policy changes, the results have been undeniably dramatic in altering the variables of security in Europe.<sup>6</sup>

One of these changes in Soviet policy--the reduction in Soviet military presence in Europe--became formalized in 1990 with the signing by twenty-two nations on November 19, 1990 of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. This treaty, though delayed in its eventual ratification due to Western objections to perceived circumventions by the Soviet Union, denoted a significant reduction if not end to the military confrontation between East and West in the center of Europe.<sup>7</sup> Underlying political changes were at the core of this treaty, but its numerical limitations provided objective assurances of a marked decline in the military threats facing Europe. In reality, the CFE Treaty along with commencement of Soviet military withdrawals represented the acceleration of the trend toward demilitarization of European security which had begun with the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987.

Further evidence that the security landscape in Europe was in the midst of major alteration in 1990 came from the London summit meeting of NATO members in early July. The

London Declaration that was issued on July 6 by NATO heads of state and government represented a new adaptation in the Alliance to the ongoing changes in Europe. While reaffirming a commitment to NATO's continued existence and purpose, the London Declaration recognized the decline of the military dimensions of security and expressed the intent to enhance the political component of the Alliance. Moreover, it stressed the inseparable link of security among all states of the "new Europe" and offered "the hand of friendship" to former adversaries in the Cold War. To give clear evidence of the transformation of the Alliance and security environment, the declaration also initiated a process of revision for NATO's force structure and strategy.<sup>8</sup> As an aftermath of the London Declaration, there was an ongoing review within NATO of Alliance strategy, force structure, and command arrangements which promised to change the physical shape of NATO in the future.

NATO's London Declaration also provided endorsement to a more prominent role for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE process, which traced its beginnings from the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975, received greater attention and impetus in 1990 with its very visible display at the Paris summit in late November. This three-day summit of thirty-four participating states culminated with the adoption of a "Charter of Paris for a New Europe." This charter, like the London Declaration, recognized the profound changes occurring in Europe and heralded an end to confrontation and a new emphasis on

cooperation. It welcomed the signing of the CFE Treaty in Paris and the adoption of new Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and endorsed further arms control and reduction steps in the future. While recognizing the right of states to choose their own security arrangements, the charter acknowledged a "new perception of security and cooperation" which offered the prospect of positive changes. To give some institutional backing to this trend, the CSCE summit created a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna.<sup>9</sup> While longer on form than substance, the summit and its charter did mark a hopeful point in Europe's history. President Bush joined others at the summit in offering words of optimism that the CSCE could play a greater role in helping Europe navigate the unknown waters of change.

In addition to these important occurrences in Europe, there was another event in 1990 with noticeable impact on future European security--the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August. The Gulf Crisis and later the Gulf War riveted the world's attention for eight months. While it did not have a direct relationship to other events and changes ongoing in Europe, it definitely provided lessons that are extremely relevant to the question of European security. One obvious lesson was that security does remain important. As President Bush stated in a speech to the Aspen Institute on August 2, that despite the change in the Soviet threat, "the world remains a dangerous place with serious threats...wholly unrelated to the earlier patterns of the U.S.-Soviet relationship."<sup>10</sup> These threats to security interests could be



unforeseen, and the capacity to react to them needs to be in existence and capable of use without delay.

Another clear lesson from the crisis and war was that when Western interests had to be defended, the principal responsibility remained with the West's leading military power, the United States. Despite America's problems and limitations at home, its leadership and power proved indispensable in upholding international order. A related corollary also appeared from the requirements for American action in the Gulf; namely that allied support, political, financial and military, was needed for America to be willing to bear the burden of security.<sup>11</sup>

For the question of European security, the Gulf War demonstrated that threats to common interests could originate outside Europe, and that Europe's security could not be easily limited in its geography or scope. North-South issues could endanger Europe and could not be neatly separated nor ignored. The term "out-of-area" had far less significance any more when addressing security needs.

The Gulf War also demonstrated the beneficial potential of cooperation in international politics, including even partnership now with the Soviet Union. Despite continued differences in some interests, the Soviets did show a new relationship through their support in the United Nations Security Council. The end of the Cold War meant collective action was more possible now than in any time since World War II.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, for European states themselves, the Gulf War

revealed stark limitations in their current collective and individual capabilities and policies. The lack of a concerted European approach or coordinated action pointed out the gap between the promise and reality of a united Europe. For some the lesson was that Europeans could never achieve a single policy in foreign and security affairs. For others, the inadequacies reinforced the need and urgency to do just that.<sup>13</sup> Either way, there was no escaping the fact that the question of Europe's future security and its relationship to the United States would be affected for years to come by this regional crisis in the Middle East.

Related to the subject of a united Europe, or the lack of it, the process of European integration continued to gather momentum in 1990 and probably was given a further boost from the Gulf War. The programs for a post-1992 Single Market in the European Community (EC) appeared to proceed on schedule. In addition, by the time of the EC summit in Rome in December, there was widespread support to continue toward even more ambitious economic and political goals of union. Two intergovernmental conferences were initiated--one on Economic and Monetary Union and another on Political Union, which also embraced the topic of a common foreign and security policy. This latter topic represented the most controversial approach as the EC began to move for the first time in a significant manner to address its future security role. This subject would increasingly become one of keen interest in both Europe and the United States and will be addressed later in this paper as it relates to America's security role. In

particular, the issue became intertwined with the related subject of the Western European Union (WEU) and its future security role in Europe. Overall, the entire integration process became a major factor in Europe in all areas, and the issue of European "architecture" would become a critical issue for the future.<sup>14</sup>

Regarding the EC, it is worth noting that the United States and the Community agreed to a "Transatlantic Declaration" in November 1990 which marked an attempt to establish a formal political dialogue. In May 1989, President Bush had called for "developing new mechanisms of consultation and cooperation," and in December 1989 Secretary of State Baker reaffirmed the need to strengthen links. In February 1990, twice yearly high level meetings were initiated, and in November the Transatlantic Declaration affirmed common goals and the principles of consultation and cooperation. These steps were a clear attempt by both the EC and the United States to maintain a close working relationship as the integration process increased its scope and speed.

From the American perspective, there came a degree of caution to Europe that it avoid endangering overall close ties. Secretary Baker echoed this in November when he warned that "As European integration proceeds, it's important that Europe, the United States, and Canada pay very close attention to strengthen transatlantic ties."<sup>15</sup> It was clear that the United States continued to view overall European integration as a positive development and one worthy of American support, though not at the expense of "cooperative" ties with the

United States. The clear definition of this relationship remained a variable for future resolution.

In summarizing major events of 1990 that influenced the European security environment, it is important to note an occurrence within the United States that relates indirectly, but importantly, to the American role in Europe's future security. That occurrence was the 1990 budget crisis and ensuing negotiations with Congress and settlement in the fall. The specific issues and numbers are not the critical matter here, rather the implications for the potential constraints and limits of America's international role. Budget deficits and the fiscal limits of American political will reflect a very real influence on the nature of the American role overseas. Military reductions projected for future years probably resulted more from the impact of these influences than from the formal limits of the CFE Treaty. In effect, the budget compromise of 1990 placed more defined limits on American military power than any treaty could have. The willingness at home to bear security burdens abroad clearly was diminishing, even at a time when such burdens were being fulfilled in the Gulf.<sup>16</sup>

Before making the transition from discussing the past security environment to analyzing the factors influencing future security roles, some mention is needed about the nature of "security" today. For many people the term security has been synonymous with military issues. This simplistic view, however, probably never had validity and certainly does not in the complex and interrelated world of the 1990s. Even in the

late 1940s, security in Western Europe referred as much to political stability and economic revitalization as it did to military defense. While self defense through use of force is the base element of security, military means and defense objectives are obviously not the totality of security policy.<sup>17</sup> A good working definition of security comes in this description from one scholar: "an ongoing effort to secure and assess threats, to diminish or limit them if possible, and to always retain capacities equal to or greater than the threats to one's environment."<sup>18</sup> These "capacities" entail military, political, economic and social elements, with the respective emphasis to different means being largely a function of the perceived "threats." Moreover, this definition involves an internal as well as external dimension, both in the threats and in the capacities. Given this broader understanding of security, it will be easier to understand the changing nature and policy choices of future European security.

#### Future Security Role: Deciding Factors

The issue at hand is what will be the deciding factors which will influence the choices for the future American role in European security. Having reviewed in some detail the process of similar decision-making in the late 1940s and likewise the nature of the altered security environment at the beginning of the 1990s, it is time to see how the many variables are likely to relate and impact for the future.

For the purposes of visualizing and addressing the wide variety of security factors, three broad categories provide a

relatively simple but valid means of analysis. First, there is the category of the security requirements for Europe. Next will be the category of American policies and perceptions. Finally to be discussed will be a similar category of European policies and perceptions, including national and multinational institutions. This method allows for ranking factors within categories and discussing their respective relationships to factors in the other categories.

### I. Security Requirements

In the late 1940s the threats to European security appeared to come primarily from the military potential of the Soviet Union and its policies in and adjacent to Europe and from the associated dangers of political and economic instability in Europe. Today the potential threats posed to European security are somewhat similar, but with distinct differences in nature and scope. The Soviet Union remains clearly the major focus of security concerns, but with the end of the Cold War and overt East-West confrontation in Europe, the nature of the concerns about the Soviet Union is much less military and far more political. The Soviet military potential, indeed, remains a serious consideration for defense planners in the West, but the future of the Soviet Union itself presents the greater unknown and concern.<sup>19</sup> The outcome of the ongoing political turmoil and economic crisis within the Soviet Union can either significantly increase or reduce the perceived dangers to the rest of Europe and the United States.

While the advent of a more cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the West has developed in recent years, uncertainty over future directions is a common concern. Whether one takes an optimistic or pessimistic view of the survival of the Soviet Union, its future shape, in any form, still presents a formidable power to be reckoned with in terms of Europe's future security and stability.<sup>20</sup> An American analyst describes the Soviet Union's future and its European role as "the most important wildcard" for European security.<sup>21</sup> Even a Soviet analyst readily acknowledges that their transformation is the "greatest challenge for international security in the short term."<sup>22</sup>

There is a strong consensus in the West that the successful evolution of the Soviet Union in its political democratization and economic restructuring is in Western interests. The likelihood of success and the means of influencing the outcome, however, remain debatable issues over which Western leaders are not in current agreement. It remains to be seen whether relations with the Soviet Union or its successor states can lead eventually to shared security interests in a cooperative system or will persist as a source of competitive engagement. Either way, events in the Soviet Union will significantly define the extent of future security requirements for Europe.

Another security factor directly related to the Soviet Union is the recent collapse of its European empire. The ensuing vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe has also created a further security uncertainty and challenge in Europe

rivalling that of uncertainty about the Soviet Union's future. In the aftermath of Soviet domination, Central and Eastern European countries have begun their respective and essentially independent efforts at political and economic reforms. The challenges of both are proving immense. Given the heterogeneous nature of most of these states, the absence of internal infrastructure for political and economic change, and the magnitude of the requirements for successful development, there is a real danger for crisis and conflict in the coming years.<sup>23</sup> In fact, the danger of ethnic conflict in these states may be the most likely source for security problems in Europe in the near term. Recent trends toward disintegration in Yugoslavia reinforce the extent of political instability in this region. If anything, the recent political-military transformations in the region have only served to increase the security needs of the continent.<sup>24</sup>

The nature of the security needs in Central and Eastern Europe is broad in scope, ranging from political to military to economic. For the West, support for the political and economic aspects of change has taken precedence. The recent establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is an example of the West's attempt to provide financial assistance to reform. The issue of territorial integrity and military security, however, remains a challenge for the countries of this region. If European security is to broaden eventually into a concept of "indivisible" security for the entire continent, the security requirements of Central and Eastern European states will have to be incorporated as



well. How this is to be accomplished--whether by a broad form of regional collective security, or by an extension of the Western structure--is a real security requirement for future years. NATO's Secretary General, Manfred Woerner, in a speech in Prague in April 1991, summed up this requirement for a "new security equation in Europe" as being "one of our most fundamental challenges in this new era...."<sup>25</sup>

Concerns about the future direction of the Soviet Union and the prospects for peaceful transformation in Central and Eastern Europe are the most important and visible sources of future European security requirements. To these can be added another potential threat emanating from outside of Europe itself, that of contingencies like the Gulf War where Third World states armed with modern weapons pose a direct challenge to European and world interests. Such challenges from so-called "weapon states" like Iraq or Libya require a broader concept of security and means of response. Does the solution rest with a "New World Order" or "out-of-area" capabilities? Either way, the future needs of European security will have to include the manner of coping with such threats.<sup>26</sup>

Overall, the uncertainties and potential threats associated with events and actions in the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in some peripheral regions and Third World states comprise the future security requirements for Europe. Without a doubt, the single most important factor in defining these requirements will be the Soviet Union. Of course, it must be stressed that the nature of these potential security requirements is not independent of

outside influence, and such influence can possibly lessen or increase the extent of the threat. The challenge is to be able to provide sufficient means of ensuring against the dangers of potential threats while at the same time taking steps to reduce the threats themselves.

## II. American Policies and Perceptions

To understand the factors likely to influence America's future role in European security, one should first start with a review of American policies and attitudes toward that role. These policies and attitudes have their roots in an understanding of American national interests. Regarding Europe these interests cover a variety of areas, but at their heart lies the fundamental and vital American interest of preventing a hostile power from dominating the Eurasian land mass. The importance of this interest and the costs to the United States of its failure have been borne out in the two World Wars in this century. A peaceful, stable, and essentially friendly European continent stands as a clear national interest of the United States.<sup>27</sup>

The critical importance of Europe to the United States derives, on the one hand, from the nature of the continent. Outside the United States and the Soviet Union, Europe represents the largest concentration of economic and military power. Considering only the countries of the EC, Europe comprises about 22% of the world's gross national product (versus about 26% for the United States and 12.5% for Japan), has a population of about 325 million (versus about 250

million for the United States and 130 million for Japan), and has 20% of the world's exports (versus 11% for the United States and 10% for Japan). For quite selfish reasons alone, Europe and its future security and stability remain of tremendous importance to the United States.<sup>28</sup>

Beyond the objective measures of Europe's significance, there are deep-seated reasons for Europe's importance to the United States. American and European societies are intermingled in their cultural roots and political traditions, and the sharing of common values has resulted, in President Bush's words, in a "natural partnership of democratic allies."<sup>29</sup> The strong bond of history and common cultures has also been further cemented by the growing economic interdependence of the United States and Europe in trade and monetary systems. Taken as a whole these American interests in Europe have been consistent since World War II and have, if anything, only increased in importance. In essence, what occurs in Europe is seen as directly affecting the United States, and Europe's stability and security are matters of fundamental concern to the United States. This view was the necessary foundation of America's post-World War II commitment to and involvement in European security through the vehicle of the North Atlantic Treaty and NATO.

#### Official Policy

Current American policy as enunciated by President Bush and Secretary of State Baker reaffirms the elements of continuity in America's interest in and commitment to European security. President Bush, in a May 1990 commencement address

on the subject, said that the United States should remain a European power in the broadest sense, and that the foundation for engagement in Europe would continue to be NATO. Additionally, he promised that militarily significant American forces would remain in Europe "for as long as our allies want--and need them." Such forces, he said, demonstrated the enduring political compact "as no word can."<sup>30</sup>

In the 1991 report on National Security Strategy, President Bush reiterated that Europe's security and stability depended on a "substantial American presence, political and military." The continued strength of the NATO Alliance and American leadership in it, he stated, remained "essential to peace." He did say, however, that the United States supported greater European integration as a step toward more "balanced sharing of leadership and responsibility." Related to this, he supported enhanced European military cooperation "within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, including both bilateral efforts and those within the Western European Union." Reflecting the changing nature of threats to Europe, Bush said American forces would be smaller and with a more global orientation. The future force levels in Europe would, moreover, be linked to the "overall Alliance response to the needs of security" and not exclusively to the size of Soviet forces. Such American forces would also be more flexible and capable of assuming broader regional responsibilities. Here there was a clear inference that American forces might be used outside Europe, as proved the case in the Gulf War. Overall, Bush's report reconfirmed American commitment to Europe while

also introducing slightly new approaches to that commitment in light of the changed security environment.<sup>31</sup>

President Bush's support for European integration was a continuation of previous American policy dating back to the 1950s. In a December 1989 speech in Berlin, Secretary of State Baker had given a strong endorsement for closer European-American cooperation to keep pace with European integration. He said the United States supported the goal of a united Europe with the same energy as before, and that the EC had a central role to play in shaping the new Europe. To implement closer cooperation, he called for strengthened links between the United States and the Community.<sup>32</sup> As was mentioned in the earlier discussion of major events in 1990, a Transatlantic Declaration in November 1990 marked a concrete step towards formalizing such a link. A major motivation for this emphasis by the United States has to be a concern that American interests, particularly relating to trade, are taken into account.

In the economic field, the United States has been supportive of the EC taking the initiative in supporting Central and Eastern European development. At the June 1989 summit in Paris of the G-7, President Bush endorsed the proposal of German Chancellor Kohl for the EC to be the clearinghouse for such economic aid. Likewise, the agreement to establish the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, backed by a 10% American contribution in a \$12 billion fund, reflected American support for a greater European role.<sup>33</sup>

While recent American policy has promoted an increased European role in economic assistance to the East, there has been a consistent theme that NATO remain the principal forum for security between the United States and Europe. In his December 1989 speech, during which Baker discussed the new architecture for European security, he called NATO the "optimal instrument" to coordinate Western defense efforts. He also endorsed CSCE as potentially the most important forum for East-West cooperation. The EC would be the economic pillar of the transatlantic relationship. Overall, he said the architectures of these three institutions "should reflect that America's security--politically, militarily, and economically remains linked to Europe's security."<sup>34</sup>

Though clearly endorsing the complementary nature of these institutions, there was no doubt which one was seen as primary in security matters. At his opening statement following a meeting with EC ministers in November 1990, Baker reconfirmed that NATO was "the means through which the fact of our mutual security interests take practical form."<sup>35</sup> As will be discussed later, American support for NATO's primacy in the security arena would cause a potential for friction as the European view of the integration process proceeded beyond economics alone.

President Bush's endorsement of greater European defense cooperation had been the continuation of a long-standing American position dating back to President Kennedy's "twin pillar" approach in 1962. The recently reinvigorated calls for a European security identity have received official

American support due largely to the desire to see Europeans assume a greater share of the defense "burden." Support for this greater European role, however, has always been with the qualification that it would be "within the Alliance." In December 1990, Secretary Baker also gave an indirect warning to the Europeans as they proceeded toward development of their enhanced security identity. He cautioned that "the path we take to arrive at a new security relationship will have serious and enduring consequences for our mutual relations and common security interests."<sup>36</sup> The process of creating this new European security identity or "European pillar" would have direct implications for the overall American role in Europe, as will be discussed later.

Summarizing the official position in the United States towards America's role in European security, there is a firm commitment at the present time for a continued active engagement in common security consultations and structures. The NATO Alliance is seen as the principal forum for security, though more formal ties with the EC and participation in an enhanced CSCE process are viewed as complementary measures in an interrelated structure. America's commitment to Europe's security receives visible emphasis through a troop presence in Europe, though such a presence is conditioned upon its future need as well as European support. There is strong backing for a greater European defense contribution and identity, but only so long as it does not undermine the primacy of NATO as a consultative and decision-making forum. Finally, and in part a result of the Gulf War, there is a willingness for and

expectation of sharing responsibilities of global leadership beyond the borders of Europe.

### Critics and Constraints

Are these official Administration policies and statements indicative of widespread public support, or do other elements in American society have views likely to undermine or challenge them? On the fundamental question of Europe's importance to the United States, there is very little dissenting opinion. Regarding specifically how the United States should be involved in Europe, there have been and continue to be dissenting opinions. Some such critics are "new isolationists" or "unilateralists" who argue that either Europe has become secondary for American foreign policy or that Europeans could afford to take care of their own defense.<sup>37</sup> Other critics, more pragmatic, argue NATO was of primary importance in the past, but that relative economic decline of the United States means Europe should do more for itself, and that American domestic needs should take precedence. This group would argue that an American withdrawal would force Europeans to do more for themselves.<sup>38</sup> Still other critics argue that the failure of Europeans to follow American leadership, such as in the Gulf Crisis, meant that they were better left to their own devices.<sup>39</sup>

Some critics of America's European role come from the so-called "declinists" school, such as Paul Kennedy and David Calleo, who argue that oversized military commitments were fiscally and financially destructive to the United States, and that such commitments were no longer warranted. Calleo called



for a policy of "geopolitical devolution" beginning with NATO.<sup>3</sup> Another approach can be found in the arguments of people such as the respected editor of Foreign Affairs, William Hyland, who wrote recently in favor of a "turn inward" for America. Hyland feels that by "winning the Cold War," the United States has earned a period of freedom to emphasize domestic priorities paid for in part by a drastic reduction in overseas commitments and foreign aid. "Why should Americans pay to defend rich European allies...?", Hyland asks.<sup>4</sup>

The theme of America's domestic needs and constraints on international commitments is pervasive throughout many influential sectors in the United States. Budgetary problems have exerted considerable pressure on all aspects of foreign policy, from military presence to economic assistance. The ability of the United States to promote its strategic interests has always been related not only to its defense and foreign policy, but likewise to its domestic policy. Recent years have witnessed growing concerns over American competitiveness and productivity and the fundamental foundations of the United States. Economic issues, which have always been important factors in international relations, have become increasingly a source of irritation, particularly in regard to Japan and its persistent and massive trade surplus with the United States. As security threats appear to diminish in magnitude, these economic issues are likely to grow in prominence. This is true both within the United States as well as in international relations.<sup>5</sup>

Are Americans turning inward and becoming preoccupied

with internal problems to the exclusion of overseas commitments? Is the United States becoming a "reluctant superpower?" The answers are not clear-cut, though there are strong strains of opinion in this direction.<sup>43</sup> American leadership in the Gulf War and the widespread public support showed that American capabilities and willingness to act to protect strategic interests were still quite vast and without equal in the world. The burdensharing criticisms that arose during the war, however, revealed resentments at bearing too large a portion of the costs. Obviously, Americans see limits to their capacity as an international actor, though they seem to recognize the need for exercising the responsibilities of the world's only superpower. American domestic policy and public support are important factors in any future policies affecting overseas commitments, and the messages at present are somewhat mixed and in a state of flux.

Studies of recent trends in American opinions on foreign policy confirm that Americans continue to favor an active international role for the United States. There is a marked decline in concerns over the Soviet threat and an increasing worry over economic and social problems as threats to national security. There is little support for withdrawing from NATO and Europe, though the willingness to spend for defense is weak, and there is a corresponding support for greater European efforts on their own behalf. A strong preference exists for more international cooperation versus unilateralism. Overall, the picture is one of solid support for an active American role in world affairs, but not without

limits and not alone.<sup>44</sup>

#### Congressional Attitudes

In discussing American support for foreign commitments, an obvious focus of attention is the Congress and its collective willingness to support Administration policy. Such willingness is normally expressed through appropriations and other legislative acts. As expressed through their legislation recently, Congress generally continues to support the American commitment to Europe via its NATO role and presence. This presence is already projected in defense plans to be reduced in Europe from over 300,000 to approximately 100,000 by 1995, and Congressional support is firm for such a reduction. There is still continued concern over the future of the Soviet Union, and in an interview for this paper, Congressman G.V. Montgomery of the House Armed Services Committee said that these uncertainties represented a principal reason to maintain American military forces in Europe. At the same time, however, Congressman Montgomery voiced strong opposition to funding new bases in Europe, such as the Crotone NATO base in Italy, as an unnecessary expense at a time of domestic budgetary cutbacks. Projected base closures in the United States, he said, were generating great pressure in the Congress against any additional overseas military construction.<sup>45</sup>

Congressman Montgomery's views were confirmed in another interview with a staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The staffer, Mr. Russell Wilson, said there was broad Congressional support for America's European role, but

that there was a potential source of friction over the burdensharing issue, especially in regard to bases. Wilson also said that increased European responsibility was seen as needed, and that Congress expected more European cooperation in dealing with regional threats. Also, economic friction and competition with Europe would grow as European integration proceeded, and the United States would be more likely to be reactive to European actions in the future. Essentially these views reflect the general impression of support of America's European role, but within limits and subject to the influence of European actions and American domestic pressures.<sup>46</sup>

On the subject of European actions and the impact on Congressional perceptions, significant causes of potential problems appear to lie with economic issues. As Congressman Montgomery and Mr. Wilson indicated, the issue of defense burdensharing and greater European efforts seem to be of foremost concern. In addition, trade conflicts loom as real threats to harmonious relations. Progress in the ongoing Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations would help ease pressures for mercantilistic blocs in Europe and North America which could threaten the fundamental European-American relationship. Discussions in Europe of forming a European Energy Community also raise fears of exclusionary policies that could be detrimental to American interests. The subject of financial aid to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is another area of possible friction in American relations with Europe, particularly if there is a divergence of views on tying aid to

reforms. It is premature to say that differences over these economic issues will actually damage basic European-American security ties, but the possibility seems to be growing as the perception of an external threat decreases.<sup>47</sup> Probably the major reason for being optimistic in this regard is the argument of mutual self interest--the costs to both the United States and Europe of damaging their relationship outweighs the limited gains.

#### Other Views

Going back to the general subject of American attitudes toward the role of the United States in Europe, a recent report prepared by a working group of Congressional, military, and academic experts provides a good gauge of prevailing opinions among policy elites.<sup>48</sup> The report, entitled "The United States & NATO in an Undivided Europe," has particular credibility because of the bipartisan and influential nature of its authors. The overall thrust of the report is that "it would be a mistake of historic proportion for the United States to withdraw completely from Europe." It supports a continuing American commitment to European security and the maintenance of some military forces in Europe, though less than the 100,000 mentioned in current plans. Such a reduced presence would serve as a guarantor and balancer in Europe and a necessary assurance against uncertainties in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, an American military presence would reassure all European states that continuance of cooperative policies was preferable to a re-nationalization of defense.

While endorsing the American commitment to NATO as the primary vehicle for military involvement in Europe, the report calls for substantial changes in the nature of the Alliance and its burdens and responsibilities. Substantial American reductions should be matched by a corresponding increase in European responsibilities, to include a European military commander in the near future. The report endorses the development of a European defense pillar as well as overall European integration. Europeans should play a larger role in their defense, and it is up to them to decide how that role is assumed. The continued American military presence, smaller but with some combat troops and nuclear weapons, is seen as essential to a stable European environment for further integration. European willingness to accept and support the American military presence remains a decisive element in persuading Americans that the Alliance deserves their support.

The report also endorses the CSCE organization as a means of building security and cooperation throughout Europe; while it maintains that NATO should not expand eastward to avoid alienating the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, it claims that the economic assistance to the East should be a primary duty of the EC. In conclusion, the report supports a continuity with America's commitment to and military involvement in European security, though with a greater emphasis on Europe's role. NATO, along with the EC and CSCE, would form the institutional pillars of Europe's security system.

The conclusions of this report have also been echoed by a well-known Congressional expert in the field of European

security, Mr. Stephen Sloan. In recent addresses on the subject, Sloan supported the "building block approach" to European security, and like the report saw important roles for NATO, the EC, and the CSCE. He described the European security system of the 1990s as one "characterized by complexity and continuing evolution" going through a "period of adjustment and uncertainty." On the subject of American troop presence in Europe, Sloan makes the point that such a deployment will depend largely on European support, public and governmental. Without a European willingness to host and support an American presence in Europe, it will be difficult if not impossible to sustain the existence of NATO. Sloan, unlike the report, does not view the continued presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe as essential.<sup>49</sup>

Taking into account both official policy statements and unofficial but informed views on the subject of European security, a rather clear consensus emerges of American intentions. Variations in opinion on some specifics exist, but in general there is solid support for continued American involvement in European security and a significant military presence in Europe. Likewise, there is a breadth of support for complementary institutions playing a role, though NATO remains the focal point for the American military commitment. Agreement prevails also in supporting a greater European share of the security effort, both the burden and responsibility. Mutual interdependence and shared interests form the basis of American engagement in Europe, though a reduced Soviet threat justifies a significant savings in military effort. Specific

levels of American military involvement in Europe appear tied to European support for such involvement. Domestic American constraints on their involvement in Europe, moreover, relate to both the perceived need for American strategic interests and of fiscal affordability, which ultimately defines the limits.

#### Divisive Issue: European Security Dimension

Given this broad appreciation of American intentions and attitudes toward European security, it is useful now to examine what appears to be the single most important and potentially divisive issue at present and in the near term. That issue is the development of a European security dimension. No other subject lately has caused as much discussion and intense and emotional debate regarding the future nature of European security. That debate is not only within Europe, but, more importantly here, also within the United States and between the United States and Europe.

The fundamental pressures for an enhanced European security dimension or "pillar", as it is often referred to, come from broad and often competing interests. First, there is the longstanding goal, originating in the United States in the 1960s, of a "partnership" with Europe which essentially refers to the goal of a more coherent European element capable of a greater defense effort. The true essence of this goal is a desire for a relative redistribution of efforts within the Atlantic Alliance. In recent years this approach has become associated with the so-called "burdensharing" argument in the United States, which has increasingly been driven by economic



and budgetary pressures to reduce the costs of America's military commitment to Europe. On the whole, this general approach supports a new balance within the framework of the Alliance, and thus can properly be described as "Atlanticist."

This Atlanticist support for a rebalancing within the Alliance was clearly enunciated by a multinational committee that was formed by the North Atlantic Assembly in the late 1980s to study the future needs of the Alliance. The Committee on NATO in the 1990s conducted a two-year study of challenges and concluded that a new "transatlantic bargain" was essential for the future vitality of the Alliance. Because of the increase in Western Europe's political and economic strength, it should share more effectively in the political, economic and military responsibilities of defense. Greater European cooperation should also entail an increased leadership role as well. The creation of a viable European pillar was endorsed as the best means of alleviating the American financial burden and ensuring the continued participation of the United States. The steps to create this pillar were addressed generally, and they included possibilities for multinational European units as well as institutional changes related to the EC or WEU. The overall theme is that the Atlantic Alliance remains crucial to Europe's and America's security interests, but that the Alliance must change to adjust to the new security environment.<sup>50</sup>

The other major source of pressure for an enhanced European security dimension comes from a desire to develop and

express cohesion of Europe as a political entity, better known as the "Europeanist" approach. Efforts for European integration, dating back to 1950 and becoming an article of faith with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, have accelerated in the 1980s and become a major force in the 1990s. The Single European Act in 1985 marked a renewed commitment toward economic integration, with the firm goal of a single market by the end of 1992, as well as toward eventual political integration in a European Union. Included in the 1985 act was a commitment to coordinate positions on the political and economic aspects of security.<sup>51</sup> Recent efforts in the EC, as mentioned earlier in this paper, have progressed even further, with the December 1990 summit establishing two separate conferences, one to address the issue of a common foreign and security policy. While not formally opposed to the Atlantic Alliance, the emphasis of these measures is primarily on the need for greater Europeanization.

With pressures for a greater European security dimension coming from these two sources, it is not surprising that there are ongoing tensions and sometimes conflicting views between those stressing an "Atlanticist" approach and those favoring the "Europeanist" emphasis. These tensions have now become intertwined in the subject of European security architectures and have emerged as a significant factor in the future European-American security relationship.

It appears that the tensions associated with European security architectures now revolve principally around two bodies, the WEU and the EC, their relationships to each other

and the corresponding relationships to NATO. The CSCE stands as another important institution whose future security role may increasingly become a factor, but for the foreseeable future it remains as a broad consultative forum without great substance or controversy. For the European security debate of the near future, and especially the American relationship, the evolution of the other two institutions has the major bearing.

The WEU was established in 1954 as a modification of the Brussels Treaty Organization, which had been formed in 1948 and has been discussed in the previous chapter. The new organization came into being primarily as a means of enabling a rearmed West Germany to join NATO. It included the addition of West Germany and Italy. As an institutional body it performed rather routine tasks, one of which was serving as a link between Britain and the EC members, until Britain joined the Community in 1973. From 1973 until 1984, the organization was essentially dormant. In 1984 it was reactivated, partly due to the inability of the EC to develop a security dimension and also as a means of permitting greater European security coordination. While related to the Community in spirit, all its members were EC members, it was a separate intergovernmental body.<sup>52</sup>

In 1987 the foreign and defense ministers of the WEU stated their intentions to develop a more cohesive European defense identity. The Hague Platform on European Security Interests stated that Western European security could "only be ensured in close association with our North American Allies," but that "a free, independent and increasingly more united

Western Europe is vital to the security of North America."<sup>53</sup> Thus the goal remained of pursuing European integration, including security and defense, while maintaining the close association with North America. American reaction, overall, was positive, and President Reagan welcomed the developments in the Hague Platform.

Subsequent developments in the WEU have included the addition of Spain and Portugal in 1988, the sponsorship of joint European actions in the Persian Gulf in 1987-1988 in "Operation Cleansweep," and coordination of European naval operations in the most recent Gulf crisis and war. Throughout 1990 and into 1991, there has been increasing activity to further development of a European defense dimension and to establish the WEU as a "bridge" between NATO and the EC. The ongoing process of the Community's Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union as well as NATO's strategy and structures reviews have also been addressing the possible future role for the WEU. A consensus has not been reached on this issue within Europe nor with the United States regarding the implications for America's continued security role. Critical outstanding problems include the membership issue, as all EC and NATO members are not a part of the WEU, and the formal link to the EC.<sup>54</sup>

More will be addressed later in the paper regarding European views on the future of the EC and its security and defense dimensions. The key point is that there is still no firm consensus on the issue, and thus it remains an unknown variable in future discussions and decisions affecting

European security. How this variable will influence American decisions also remains an open question on both sides of the Atlantic. '

While it has been already mentioned that the United States generally supports the process of European integration as well as the development of an increased and more balanced European role in the security effort, the position on specific institutional changes is far less clearly defined. Are American views compatible with the options being discussed for a European security identity? Could any of these options threaten to undermine the underlying American commitment to European security? These are questions being tackled at present in the ongoing process of transition in the aftermath of the Cold War in Europe.

In President Bush's National Security Strategy in 1990, he specifically supported efforts in the WEU to increase military cooperation. At the December 1990 NATO foreign ministers meeting, Secretary Baker endorsed the development of the WEU into the European pillar of the Alliance. At the same time, however, he warned that the path taken to develop the new European security dimension would have consequences on European-American relations and security interests. He said that "A world order...cannot rest on a Europe divided from North America," and that open and reinforcing consultations were needed.<sup>55</sup>

NATO's London Declaration in July 1990, of which the United States was a principal architect, previously endorsed the political and economic integration of the EC, "including

the development of a European identity in the domain of security," as a contribution to stability and Atlantic solidarity.<sup>56</sup> This general and rather undefined endorsement obviously was not unconditional, as would become apparent in 1991 as more detailed European proposals surfaced.

By February 1991 the EC's Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union was proceeding with serious consideration of an earlier proposal that would support the WEU eventually becoming the defense arm of the Community. In a State Department demarche on February 19 to certain European capitals, the United States voiced concerns about this proposal. While supporting "some relationship" between the WEU and the EC, the intent of the demarche was to warn against developing a bloc approach to defense which would turn Europe into more of a rival than a partner. It was becoming apparent that there were limits to American support for this European security identity.<sup>57</sup>

A more public pronouncement of the American reservations was made in early February. At a speech in London, American NATO Ambassador William H. Taft, IV discussed the future role of the United States in a new Europe, with particular emphasis on the development of a European security dimension. Taft said it was not for the United States "to prescribe the means by which Europeans should exercise their collective authority or assume greater responsibility," though he cautioned "if you do not assume this role in association with the United States, we will be disappointed." He reiterated support for a European pillar, but one within the Alliance for its missions

and only outside for new missions. This latter reference pointed to be pervasive American objective for Europe to assume a greater role and responsibility outside of Europe, as for example in the Gulf War. Taft proceeded to identify some principles to guide the "Europeanization" of NATO. Included in these were the strengthening of Alliance effectiveness, promotion of common interests, affirmation of the ability of all to participate, and enhancement of collective defense effort. NATO "must remain the principal organization to provide for European security," he argued, though the EC and the CSCE would play complementary roles. Taft concluded with a specific caution that the American public's view would ultimately determine the position on future roles. The public would not understand, he said, if Europeans replaced NATO with other structures or changed it into a location to resolve bloc differences. In the final analysis, American public opinion as demonstrated in polls and especially through the Congress will determine Administration policies.<sup>58</sup>

Taft's speech and the February demarche were indicative of a growing American wariness about the possible direction of the new European security dimension. This wariness received more attention in the coming months as deliberations within the EC, the WEU, and NATO all proceeded to address the issue and force the United States to refine its reservations. Refinement did occur in the process of interagency reviews within the Administration, and by April general consensus was reached on how to approach the European proposals. In essence, the approach was to avoid specific attacks on

European proposals while at the same time emphasizing principles to be used as measures for them.

These principles followed the lines of supporting what Europeans themselves decided on, continuing the emphasis on NATO as the principal location for consultation and agreement on security commitments, retaining NATO's integrated military structure, supporting European efforts to improve their capability to act beyond Europe, and avoiding the exclusion of any Alliance members. In addition, within the NATO sphere the United States would stress consideration of the military implications of any European proposal. All of these concerns had been raised in one way or another in earlier speeches or policy statements, but now the effort seemed to be concentrating on communicating American reservations in order to influence directly ongoing European discussions. Whether such an approach would be effective or counter-productive remained an open issue. What was certain, however, was that American perceptions of European proposals and actions were beginning to influence American policy-making.<sup>59</sup>

Besides the formal policy statements and governmental actions, some less public and less official remarks from influential figures throw additional light on the subject. Some very candid and direct views surfaced in an interview with the European political adviser to a senior State Department official. This well-informed individual, Mr. Alex Wolff, said that the changing nature of the Soviet threat was having the greatest impact on European security as well as on American budgets. He felt there would be a period of



ambiguity as the security picture remained in a fluid status. The real questions were what the Europeans wanted for their security and what type of European pillar they sought to create. Unlike the period of the late 1940s, when there was more of a vacuum in Western Europe, today there is a greater sense of economic competition influencing events. Wolff's opinion was that structures were not the main issue, and that the groping here was really a camouflage. Instead, the critical issue for the future was political will. Substantive actions and the use of structures would actually have the greatest impact on American perceptions and ultimate policies. For the issue of European political will, politics are the biggest factor, both within individual countries and in the collective organizations. These insights, while not contradicting public policy statements, present a clearer picture of what factors may be the most important.<sup>60</sup>

Wolff's opinions received independent confirmation in a speech by an influential expert on Europe and American policy, Ambassador Rosanne Ridgway. Ambassador Ridgway, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and currently President of the Atlantic Council of the United States, addressed the closing session of the NATO Symposium held recently in Washington. Regarding future American choices on how to pursue its interests in Europe, she said the main influences would be the needs, circumstances, and European attitudes. Like Wolff, she played down the form of institutions, saying that they should not be used as a guide. Form would follow substance, and that substance would be the

best indicator of true intentions. For the future, she said, Europe must decide what it wants and what it is to be. The definition of Europe remained uncertain and sometimes confusing; the reference here obviously to the membership issue in various organizations such as the EC and the WEU. For the membership or "definition of Europe" issue, a principal challenge was the status of Turkey. Ambassador Ridgway said Turkey should not be isolated and left alone. This concern over Turkey's role was one heard from a wide variety of sources, both governmental and academic, and it probably stands as a likely measurement, from the American perspective, of future European structures. The bottom line theme of Ridgway's speech was that the future of America's transatlantic commitment was in European hands.<sup>61</sup>

These various views and opinions on America's future security role in Europe all appear to share the common thread of emphasizing European policies and choices as a major determinant for American decisions. To be fair, there have also been some reservations voiced from Americans and Europeans concerning the direction of recent American policies and warnings to Europe. Columnist William Pfaff recently criticized apparent American efforts to expand influence over the European Allies based primarily on military credibility. He cites confusion among the Europeans caused by initial American complaints that they had not done enough for their own defenses followed now by complaints that they wanted to do too much. Pfaff feels that "unconsidered American ambitions, no longer backed up by overall national performance"

jeopardizes longstanding cooperation with Europe.<sup>62</sup>

Pfaff's concern that American reservations about European actions masked an unwarranted attempt to continue American dominance have been echoed in Europe as well. A recent article by French columnist, Dominique Moisi, admonishes the United States for being too defensive about European intentions. He says that it is time for the United States "to put its words and its actions together" and support European integration unambiguously. America cannot continue to favor increased European burdens and fail to share decisions.<sup>63</sup> Thus, from some perspectives at least, American efforts to caution Europeans about their future security decisions are considered either inconsistent or even antithetical to future relations.

In summary, the issue of the European security dimension promises to persist as a focal point of transatlantic dialogue and a factor in influencing mutual perceptions and actions. Because of the wider context of "security" today, the issue will spill over into political, military, and economic arenas and defy confinement to one forum alone. This issue, like the overall question of America's future role in Europe, will not be decided in a geographic vacuum, but rather will experience pressures from a wide variety of sources and locations. Future American policies will not be determined solely in the United States, no more than European policies will be determined only in Europe. In this period of transition, there is likely to be a mutual groping for answers to uncertain questions. This groping will be an interactive

process in which actions and reactions on both sides of the Atlantic will have an influence on each other.

### III. European Policies and Perceptions

Having devoted considerable attention to examining American policies and perceptions regarding European security, it is essential to expand the view to corresponding policies and perceptions in Europe. Many of these have already been addressed in the course of discussing the issues and ongoing events in Europe. To aid in defining a better focus, therefore, it is useful to pose two questions as a means of developing an understanding of the existing European environment. First, what is the objective regarding European security in general? Secondly, and more specifically, what is the objective regarding America's future role in European security? To answer these questions, it is appropriate to deal with two categories of sources of policies and perceptions--multinational organizations and individual states.

The primary multinational organizations relevant here for European security are NATO, the EC, the WEU, and the CSCE. While two include the United States as a member, all consist mainly of European states, and all are deeply involved now in grappling with the future needs for European security. It is important to see how each organization approaches the future and with what perceptions and pressures each brings to the subject of the American role.

## North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Much has already been said of NATO's position and ongoing process of review and evolution. From the London Declaration in July 1990 up to ministerial sessions in the spring of 1991, there have been many clear indications of direction for the future. In official pronouncements and in a variety of public and private statements, the expression of objectives and perceptions has been fairly explicit. Overall, the Alliance is set on a path of change to adapt to the new security environment, but essentially by adapting, not discarding the existing security instruments. The emphasis on a broader dimension of security has led to more discussion of the political nature of NATO and the importance of crisis management and cooperative engagement with the East. At the same time, the existing defense structures are undergoing review and change, ranging from the recent announcements regarding altered military structures, to in-progress efforts to change the command structure and overall strategy. There is a strong consensus to retain the basic elements of a collective defense organization, although in a smaller and somewhat different configuration.

NATO communiqués have continued to stress the indivisibility of security and the need for sharing responsibilities as reflected in the integrated military structure. Not surprisingly, the continued presence of American and Canadian forces in Europe is still considered "indispensable." While future military structures will be smaller and more multinational in nature, the need for some

significant military capability remains a strong element of continuity.<sup>64</sup>

For future European needs, NATO endorsed in December 1990 the concept of a "framework of interlocking institutions" to accommodate the interests of all European states. No one institution would have a monopoly, but instead they would be complementary of each other. The CSCE process received specific support as a vehicle to provide assurance and a cooperative role to all states, including the Soviet Union and Central and East European states. To the somewhat delicate issue of security associations for the former Warsaw Pact members, NATO claimed not to be "indifferent" but emphasized the role of the CSCE, the EC, and only interaction, not formal membership, with NATO.<sup>65</sup>

NATO, as mentioned earlier, has also specifically endorsed the development of a European security identity and defense role, though with the important qualification that it should lead to a "strengthened European Pillar within the Alliance." The primary role for NATO has been reemphasized in the May 1991 ministerial communique, which said that "NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation...and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members...."<sup>66</sup> On the specific and contentious issue of the European pillar, however, there is no consensus at present within NATO.

Regarding the question of the nature of this pillar and its relationship to NATO and its corresponding relationship to the EC, there are presently incompatible European views. The

future role of the WEU has become the focus of this debate within NATO. Various "brainstorming" sessions have been held on the subject as well as extensive behind-the-scenes contacts, but no conclusion is near at hand. Sharp divisions exist, with France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy being principal supporters of a strong European identity, and Britain and the Netherlands being among the most cautious. Not surprisingly, Turkey has voiced the strongest concerns about any actions excluding any NATO members. Overall, the issue promises to be ongoing and a source of friction and debate.<sup>67</sup> The United States is playing a key role in the process by emphasizing principles and a relatively low key public approach coupled with stronger private warnings. Without a doubt, the issue is the subject of intense European and transatlantic interaction and will likely continue as such.

On the subject of America's future role in European security, NATO has been particularly strong in its support for a close transatlantic relationship. Secretary General Woerner, in his April 1991 address to a Prague conference on future European security, said that "the firm commitment of the North American democracies to the destiny of Europe has preserved the peace and will continue to be our guarantee for a stable world." Also, he stressed that "only this transatlantic mutual commitment will enable NATO to perform...its enduring stability function."<sup>68</sup> NATO as an organization, as well as its members individually, all seem to endorse emphatically the "vital transatlantic link." On exactly how this link should be maintained and with whom

remains slightly more contentious.

#### European Community

Within Europe the most visible and possibly most important forum for debate on future European security is the EC. This organization has progressively developed from its inception in the 1950s into the preeminent economic force in Europe and one of three economic powers, along with the United States and Japan, in the world. Further economic integration is planned as the Single Market of 1992 approaches and as economic and monetary union becomes more developed in the 1990s. While economic and trade issues are far from completely resolved, the Community's economic predominance in Europe is essentially unchallenged. Attention now has been shifting toward the broader and more ambitious goal of true political union and its corresponding elements of a common foreign and security policy. It is in this latter area that debate has become the most heated and relevant to the topic of America's future security role.

Political union has always been an ultimate objective for most participants in European integration. The Single European Act in the 1980s accelerated the pace toward this goal, and the Community, with a French and German initiative, moved in 1990 toward the creation of an intergovernmental conference on political union "embracing a common foreign and security policy." In December 1990, the Community's European Council said that initially areas of common security interest--arms control, CSCE and UN matters, and arms production and trade cooperation--should be stressed, but that a future



defense-related role should be considered as well.

Agreement on even some of the initial areas of focus, namely arms' production and trade, is not likely in the immediate future. Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome excluded arms trade, and repeal of this restriction will face strong resistance from national industries. How far the Community goes in this area will be a good measure of willingness to subordinate national sovereignty in new areas.<sup>69</sup>

The ongoing Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union is the principal forum for gauging sentiment within the EC on future European security objectives and roles. Debate has thus far focused on various proposals for implementing a common security and defense policy. As in the case of discussions within NATO over the WEU's future relationship, there is no consensus yet on the specifics of converting a broad goal into actual policy and structure. While consensus does seem to exist on the need to develop a European security identity initially through the WEU and to maintain its compatibility with NATO, there is no consensus on the nature of the WEU's relationship to the Political Union and likewise to NATO. Moreover, the issue of rapid reaction forces and their organization and possible areas of employment remain a further obstacle and point of contention.<sup>70</sup>

Sharpening of the debate within the EC has been aided by the strong advocacy of Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, for a defined security and defense role for the Community. In a March 1991 speech in London, Delors publicly defended the need for a defense role as vital to the

unification of Europe. In particular, he endorsed the incorporation of the WEU into the Community to form the "second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." Included within this integration would also be multinational European forces or intervention units as "expressions of European unity."<sup>71</sup>

The Delors speech was not the first time a WEU merger into the EC had been proposed, a 1990 Italian proposal had already raised the issue, but it did serve to hasten the pace of debate. Additionally, Delors seemed to be pressing for a more rapid timetable, with the possibility for a common military force associated with the Community as early as 1995. WEU incorporation was seen occurring in 1998 when the Brussels Treaty expired. Delors' proposed pace did not coincide with the majority views within the EC for a more gradual development of WEU ties, such as specifically included in a French and German proposal. Even a more gradual WEU integration met with opposition out of fears of jeopardizing NATO and the American commitment. By mid-1991, the issue remained far short of resolution.<sup>72</sup>

There is no question that one of the main sources of disagreement within the EC over its future defense role has to do with concerns over the future American role. In his speech, Delors attempted to diffuse the issue by endorsing the Atlantic Alliance and saying that a united Europe with its own security and defense identity could be the best partner in a revived relationship. He sought to deal with specific American concerns by saying that fears of a European "bloc" were inconsistent with American support for European

integration and implied unwarranted doubts about Europe's commitment to the Alliance.<sup>73</sup>

Another indication of the awareness to American sensitivities over the issue came from an interview with an official of the European Council, who said there were misunderstandings on both sides of the Atlantic. He said the American demarche in February 1991, which raised some caution about Community proposals, was not understood by some European states, particularly France. Greater clarity on the subject was needed, within Europe first, before a mutual understanding could be reached with the United States. In a revealing comment in which he admitted the interrelationship of political, economic, and security relations, the official said that security matters were probably dominant.<sup>74</sup>

What is readily apparent in the midst of the discussion within the EC is that American perceptions of these developments, along with European perceptions of American attitudes and actions, are actively influencing the process of defining security issues and roles. The dynamics of interaction are taking place simultaneously among Europeans and between Europeans and Americans.

#### Western European Union

If the EC is one of the most visible centers of debate over future European security issues, the WEU has been the actual object of much of that debate. As was mentioned earlier, there has been much recent attention to the development of the WEU as the European pillar. Recent reports and meetings of the WEU shed light on the nature of the

organizational issues that are facing Europe at the present.

In February 1991 the WEU issued a report on the subject of European security and a European defense identity. It refers to three complementary levels for organizing security: at the European level with WEU and the EC, at the Atlantic level with NATO, and at the Pan-European level with CSCE. The Atlantic Alliance, it concludes, "will remain imperative in the years to come" as the framework for collective defense and the forum for common security concerns. While also reaffirming support for keeping North American forces in Europe, the report says that Europeans must define how to form and strengthen a European pillar within the Alliance. It states that Europe must take greater responsibility through an identifiable component "which will only be achieved if it is linked to the broader process of achieving a European Union...."<sup>75</sup> This question, the relationship to the EC, is one at the core of the debate over the European security identity. Moreover, it is a question for which no consensus has been reached within the WEU or EC membership.

The overall thrust of the WEU report is a recommendation for the WEU to become "the channel of cooperation" between European Political Union and NATO by taking on "operational responsibilities." The issue of specific ties to the EC is left undefined, though one option is cited that the EC could provide "guidelines" for WEU cooperation. Another very critical problem, the membership issue, is also left vague. The report only says that close cooperation with non-members is essential, and that observer status could be one option for

dealing with the problem.<sup>76</sup>

Remarks by WEU leaders have generally echoed the same themes contained in the February report. Secretary General Van Eekelen has stressed the dual need for retaining the American commitment to European security while simultaneously increasing Europe's capabilities to protect its interests within and outside Europe. Van Eekelen believes both transatlantic and European cooperation are compatible and that the WEU can be both the European pillar within the Alliance and the security dimension of European integration. He thinks American reservations about a bloc approach and over the membership issue can be accommodated.<sup>77</sup>

Similar optimistic views were expressed by WEU Deputy Secretary General Horst Holthoff in an address at the 1991 NATO Symposium in Washington. Holthoff said the EC-WEU-NATO relationship would be crucial for future European security. He thought European security without NATO was an "illusion." Moreover, he saw the expression of American reservations to Europeans about weakening the Alliance as being quite natural. Though admitting there were differences in views about the WEU's future, he said that there was no potential for real serious disputes with the United States since there was agreement on the fundamentals. Holthoff also did not believe the WEU would become subordinate to the EC.<sup>78</sup>

The somewhat optimistic opinions of Van Eekelen and Holthoff appeared to play down conflicting objectives that exist in the WEU. Some states, with France the most vocal, want the WEU to develop and become an independent forum within

the EC. The issue of the "formal" WEU-EC link appears the most contentious in the long term, and the structure of any European "intervention" forces may be the divisive short term issue. Any attempt to create such forces in a way competitive with NATO is likely to meet strong American opposition. The possibility, however, does exist for some form of WEU forces for use outside NATO's area. Such a force would not necessarily conflict with NATO's own rapid reaction forces, plans for which were announced in May 1991.<sup>79</sup>

The overall nature of developments within the WEU does not seem to support a complete "Europeanization" of Europe's defense, but instead favors some form of complementary institutional approach with NATO, the EC, and the WEU all playing important roles. Details of how such a system could function are still incomplete. Eventually what is agreed upon regarding the membership issue, institutional ties to NATO and the EC, and the nature of European forces will be the most important indicators of the WEU's future. American perceptions of these more concrete actions will, likewise, impact significantly on America's future security ties with Europe.

#### Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The final multinational organization with a direct role in European security is also the newest, the CSCE. Since its beginning in 1975, the CSCE has gradually grown in its influence and potential, with the 1990 CSCE summit in Paris culminating a recent period of increased prestige and promise. As previously mentioned, the United States, while not always

an enthusiastic supporter of the CSCE, has officially endorsed it as an integral part of Europe's security architecture. The 1990 summit and its resulting charter also gave the CSCE a boost toward further institutionalization and visibility.

While the CSCE may have a potential role for future European security, that role currently is limited mainly to its political purpose of providing a framework for promoting cooperation in other institutions. Its security role is quite elementary at this stage, with confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBMs), the peaceful settlement of disputes, and disarmament being its primary focus. These areas are quite important and helpful in promoting security and stability, but fall far short of actually providing or guaranteeing either. Still, the CSCE does promise to persist as a relevant factor in Europe's post-Cold War transition, and the 1992 meeting in Helsinki could bring it additional importance if subsequent disarmament negotiations come under its sponsorship.<sup>80</sup>

There have been quite a few advocates in Europe of a much greater future role for the CSCE. German Foreign Minister Genscher has touted it as the basis for a pan-European order and as the best framework for integrating East and Central European countries. In Italy the CSCE has received strong emphasis as well from Foreign Minister De Michelis, who views it as the ultimate basis for a single security system for all of Europe.<sup>81</sup> The Soviet Union has also been a source of considerable support for an enhanced security role for the CSCE. From the Soviet perspective, the CSCE offers a better

replacement to the previous East-West bloc confrontation than does an expanded Western security system.<sup>82</sup>

Though these advocates of the CSCE have high hopes for its utility, the promise far exceeds the current reality. That reality is of an unwieldy and loosely organized forum which can ratify consensus but not create it. It falls far short of being the instrument of a security guarantee for Europe's future. The potential for the CSCE to become more central in European security rests on the evolution of a commonality in purpose among all its members. Short of that it can still be a useful component in improving the political environment in Europe and promoting principles of behavior and mutual confidence. The future for the CSCE as a major security factor, however, remains doubtful at worst and long term at best. Its short term impact, therefore, on the American security role in Europe is negligible. Any major change in the nature of the CSCE would, of course, have to reflect conditions that could not help but bear directly on the role of all countries, including the United States.

#### Soviet Union

Turning now from these multinational organizations to individual countries, it is important to understand the influence and importance of the principal European states. In terms of overall European security, the Soviet Union is unquestionably a major factor, as it was in the post-World War II period. Its influence, however, is mainly that of creating the security requirement, not the solution. As has been discussed earlier in this paper, the future uncertainty about



the Soviet Union's policies and structural development and stability remains a dominant element in all European security calculations. Without question, the Soviet Union will continue to be a significant consideration in all future security decisions. Depending on its eventual evolution, it could even become an active participant in a wider security system in Europe, just as it could become a partner in a new international order. For the near term, the Soviet Union remains more of a factor in determining the security needs. Western desires not to unduly isolate or antagonize the Soviet Union, however, will exert some restraint on any eastward expansion of Western security structures.

#### Central and Eastern Europe

Besides the Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern European countries will also have a large impact on future security requirements. The existing security vacuum in these states has already caused some pressures on NATO to expand to the east to reduce this vacuum. As previously mentioned, NATO has expanded its contacts with these countries and is likely to develop even closer relationships in the future. In early June 1991, NATO even went so far as to announce that any "coercion or intimidation" directed at these states would be considered a matter of "direct and material concern" to NATO countries.<sup>83</sup> While NATO obviously is aware of this area of security "need," it still remains sensitive to Soviet fears and is thus unlikely to expand formally in the near future. Therefore, to some degree analogous to the Soviet Union, these countries of the former Soviet empire primarily represent

requirements in the overall security environment.

While not direct participants in some of the ongoing security "structures" debate, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could have an influence on the outcomes. A good example of this comes from recent statements of support for NATO from these states. President Havel of Czechoslovakia, in March 1991, became the first leader from this area to visit NATO headquarters. A few weeks earlier, his foreign minister, Jiri Dienstbier, stated during a similar visit that "security in Europe is impossible without NATO."<sup>2</sup> Similar support has come from other officials from the states of the former Warsaw Pact. Without a doubt, there is a strong desire among these states to safeguard themselves against a reversal of policy by the Soviet Union. In general, these states are likely to support the continued existence of security structures that act as insurance against possible Soviet pressures and actions. Moreover, they are also likely to support a continued American involvement in European security for the same reasons.

Within the realm of direct participants in decisions on European security, there are three major actors who will exert the most influence on determining the nature of the American role. These states are Britain, France, and Germany. Other European countries, individually and collectively, play an important part in various specific areas, but these three countries comprise the true core of the European security calculus.

## Britain

Given the earlier review of its crucial post-World War II role in gaining American participation in European security, it comes as no surprise that Britain stands as the strongest European supporter of a central role for NATO and the United States. The "special relationship" between Britain and the United States may have deteriorated some in the past decades, but each nation still sees each other as its most reliable security partner in Europe and the world. Recent demonstrations of this reliability and mutual confidence in the Gulf Crisis and War gave further proof to this unique relationship and dispelled doubts on both sides. A rather blunt summation of British views was given in December 1990 by a Ministry of Defense spokesman to a visiting group from the NATO Defense College. When asked if British policy was not too closely tied to the Americans instead of to fellow Europeans, the spokesman answered that in matters of security actions counted more than words, and when actions were needed the United States was the only country that could truly be counted on.

Britain, more than any other state, has been unequivocal in her endorsement of a continued American security presence in Europe. Following a meeting with Chancellor Kohl in March 1991, British Prime Minister Major said that the "pivotal role of the United States is clear" and that it "must remain in Europe."<sup>85</sup> Major's view represents a strong continuity with the statements of Churchill and Bevin from a different era. Britain still remains a staunch advocate for retaining

America's direct participation in European security, just as she continues to remain firmly committed to the objective of continental defense.

In her active involvement with continental defense, Britain has devoted considerable expenditures and commitment to the structures of collective defense. The burdens of Britain's continental defense role, primarily through the British Army of the Rhine, have amounted to almost 40% of her overall defense expenditures. Plans to reduce this commitment by half by the mid-1990s reflect the changing security environment and will likewise reduce the costs. This specific British military presence on the continent had been included in the 1954 revised WEU Treaty, and thus it entails a firm national commitment to collective European defense efforts.<sup>86</sup>

It is in her close ties to the WEU, moreover, that Britain seems likely to exert pressures in the ongoing security debate in Europe. Though maintaining her strong support for NATO and the American role, Britain has favored strengthening the WEU as a means of improving European defense efforts and cooperation within the Alliance. Within NATO Britain has been the driving force behind proposals to define the WEU role and relationship to make it compatible with NATO and also a potential means of coordinating European defense actions outside the NATO area. Britain favors a stronger WEU, but one that strengthens NATO, not duplicates it or threatens the American participation.<sup>87</sup>

Recent NATO decisions to form a rapid reaction corps, with a large British contribution and under British command,

also reflect evidence of British support for NATO as well as a greater European role within it. From the British perspective, such a force is compatible with NATO and at the same time opens the possibility for a European role, under the WEU, outside NATO. Britain supports building a European defense identity, but only in a way which sustains a long term American presence.

It is interesting to note that in recent British-American discussions about the WEU's future role and relationship with NATO, the British have asked the Americans not to support their proposals publicly. Their rationale was that American support would "taint" the proposal in other European eyes. This insight is revealing of the interactive nature of ongoing debate on European security, with respective European and American perceptions of each other having an impact on actual policies. The British are closest to being the "mediator" between American and European differences on some issues, especially regarding the definition of the European defense identity.<sup>88</sup>

The British have been the strongest supporters of the concept of the WEU being a "bridge" between NATO and the EC. They have previously opposed efforts in the EC to move too quickly to a defense arm under its authority and instead favor the WEU's enhanced role as vehicle to accommodate EC and NATO institutional positions. In this view Britain has been supported by both the Netherlands and Portugal. It remains to be seen whether Britain can successfully guide competing American and European interests through the rough waters of

structural reforms, but it seems she is the most intent on trying.

#### France

If Britain represents one end of the European spectrum in the current security debate, at the opposite end on most issues stands France. Regarding the key issues in that debate--the role of NATO, the nature of the European security identity, the future of the EC, and the American role--France generally advocates positions at variance with British views. Moreover, given the history of French foreign and security policies since the 1960s, it is not surprising that France is also the main proponent of positions most at odds with America. In the debate over Europe's future security structures, France and the United States seem likely to be protagonists, albeit still allies, for the foreseeable future.

While important here to focus on the differences in French views on security issues, it is also vital to recognize the continuity with American and other European positions. France remains a strong proponent of the Atlantic Alliance and an American role in Europe's security as well as an American military presence on the continent. She remains committed to the need for nuclear weapons and a formidable conventional military capability. France has always been at the forefront of the European integration movement, and she is a leader in the push for a "deeper" EC, including more effective European cooperation in foreign policy and security matters. In particular, France advocates a more cohesive and effective form of European defense cooperation.<sup>89</sup>

Though apparently in agreement with American policy objectives and other European views in most if not all of the preceding areas, France has taken distinctly different positions regarding specific issues. Much of the difference in French policy relates to their attitude toward NATO and the EC. Ever since President DeGaulle's expression in 1966 of a more independent French position within the Atlantic Alliance, France has been at odds with the United States over the centrality of NATO's position in European security. Today, that issue still represents a major stumbling block in harmonizing French with American security policies on future European security.

France continues to see NATO as an important element in Europe's security, but only as one element among many. NATO's role and importance should diminish, in the French view, as European integration and cooperation progresses. The French value NATO's contribution as a source of multilateral solidarity, especially as a means of cementing Germany's integration, but have doubts about the continuing need for an integrated military structure. The integrated military command and structure previously have been considered a vehicle of undue American domination in the defense realm, and the French tend to oppose its continuation or strengthening in any way. This was the source of much recent discontent by President Mitterrand over the NATO decision to form a rapid reaction corps, which was seen as an undesirable broadening of NATO's scope.<sup>90</sup>

The French have not withdrawn completely from a role in

NATO's future, and this March even became a participant in the current strategy review process. The example of active French involvement in the Gulf War under American command also offered the prospect of a more open French attitude toward its participation in the military structure of NATO. Without a doubt the French are more pragmatic now about cooperation with the United States, though not necessarily in the same manner the Americans desire. The recent debates over specific security structures and the European identity have revealed significant differences of perspective.<sup>91</sup>

A major source of friction between France and the United States relates to the future role of the EC in security and defense matters. France has been a chief proponent, along with EC Commission President Jacques Delors, of a separate European defense identity under the EC, which would form the European basis of a new Atlantic "partnership" replacing NATO. Lately the debate has centered on the WEU's role and relationship to NATO and the EC, and the French, joined by the Italians, Spanish and Belgians, advocate the WEU's position as a vehicle for an independent European defense identity. As mentioned earlier, no European consensus has been reached on the issue, though a majority of EC members now favor the WEU's role as the EC's future defense arm. For the near term, France is likely to continue as the principal supporter for this position.<sup>92</sup>

The nature of French views toward the future American role in European security contains the seeds of potential discord. Mr. Dominique Moisi of the French Institute of



International Relations captured the essence of French policy lately when he wrote that "Europe needs America...as much as in 1948...but in different ways." Moisi argued that the United States must continue to be linked to Europe by common values, but that the "form" of America's presence in Europe had to be compatible with the evolving environment and structures in Europe. In his view the EC was the key institution for the future. Through this institution and its links with the CSCE and initially NATO, Europe needed to accept greater burdens as well as responsibility for decisions for its future defense. Moisi admits the transition period will be difficult for Europe and the United States, but that it was time for the United States "to put its words and its actions together" on the subject of Europe's security identity. On the related topic of America's presence in Europe, Moisi argues that such presence is likely to continue only if Europeans, especially Germans, declare unambiguously in favor of it.<sup>93</sup>

Whether American participation in future European security is compatible with the French concept of a more independent European security identity remains the great uncertainty. American support for NATO's continued principal role in security issues is at odds with the French view of an Atlantic partnership between the United States and an enhanced European Community. The objections and strong reservations voiced by American leaders over the movement for a European security identity reflect the depth of disagreement presently dividing American and French policies. Also clouding the

issue is the ambiguity in France's support for greater European integration, while at the same time maintaining the strongly independent nature of her foreign and defense policies. Is France willing to surrender her national sovereignty to a European organization in matters of defense? Can French nuclear independence be accommodated with British policies to form a viable European nuclear deterrent? These and other difficult questions remain ahead.

For the near term, the subject of security structures seems the most probable barometer of European positions and European-American relations. What has become readily apparent in recent months is that European attitudes and policies have affected and are being influenced by American attitudes and policies. The February 1991 American demarche was a perfect example of the interactive nature of the transatlantic debate on security structures. The French have been the most vocal in complaints that Americans were too defensive about European initiatives related to defense structures. On the other hand, NATO's recent adoption of the rapid reaction corps demonstrates that American concerns have had an impact. Respective sensitivities to each other's views and actions will continue to characterize the security debate.

French attitudes toward future European security structures are particularly relevant due to her position as the most militarily powerful European state, next to the Soviet Union. That military power, however, is not necessarily readily usable as evident by France's rather small Gulf War contribution. In political terms, moreover, France

has often taken more of a back seat to Britain and Germany. In terms of economic power, Germany has clearly eclipsed France, with Italy likewise gaining ground. Thus, while France appears to be in the lead for a European security identity, that leadership is far from unchallenged. In addition, one of the principal factors in French security policy has always been another European state--Germany. It is, therefore, quite appropriate to conclude the review of European security attitudes and policies by examining the crucial role of Germany.

#### Germany

In the earlier discussion of the developing security ties of the late 1940s, the question of Germany and its future loomed as a major factor in Western and American policies. The goal of integrating Germany into the West was a primary objective at that time, and the objective of keeping Germany firmly in the Western sphere has continued as a dominant concern ever since. Throughout the 20th century, moreover, Germany has been the key in determining Europe's strategic context. The same is likely to hold true in the 1990s as Europe continues to evolve in the post-Cold War environment. How Germany fits into this new environment will impact tremendously on the future shape of European security and the American role within it.<sup>94</sup>

Germany's importance in European security calculations has been significantly affected by recent events in Europe. The collapse of the Soviet empire has reduced Germany's role as the front-line defense against an imminent military threat,

while it has thrust Germany into even greater prominence in the political and economic arenas of European security. The reunification of Germany in October 1990 culminated the formal Cold War, and it also dramatized the changing nature of Germany's future role. No longer would Germany be the object of Europe's division, but rather it would be at the forefront of European efforts to overcome past divisions.

The relative power and significance of Germany within Europe increased with the 1990 reunification. In almost every objective measurement, from population to economic capacity and potential, Germany stands as the preeminent European state. True, the problems and challenges of incorporating eastern Germany have proved costly and complex, but no one questions the fact that the reunified Germany of the future will be the "first among equals" in the European constellation of states.

Since World War II, the policy pursued by the West Germany government was one of close integration with Western security and economic structures, NATO and the EC. Reunification has not affected that commitment, and Germany remains a strong advocate of the instruments of Western stability and security which did much to bring about reunification on largely Western terms. At present Germany is an active participant and leader in all the multinational institutions related to European security--NATO, the EC, the WEU, and the CSCE. The issue facing the future is on what specific path will Germany attempt to influence these organizations?

On the question of future European security, Germany has been in the mainstream of those supporting a greater European role and defense identity or "pillar." At the same time, German policy has also tended to "touch all bases" by continuing to voice strong support for the role of this pillar within the Alliance, not outside it. In effect Germany has attempted to continue its close ties and cooperation with other European nations without risking its close relations and friendship with the United States. German gratitude for the strong American support in its reunification process obviously has made Germany even more desirous of not appearing to take sides against the United States in the current security debates.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, Germany was a co-author with France of a draft proposal for formalizing the WEU's relationship to the EC. German policy appears to be attempting to remain involved in the European integration process, but in a manner compatible with continued American involvement in Europe.

Germany, as mentioned before, has also been a main proponent of the CSCE process and its enhanced role. Foreign Minister Genscher has been an especially vocal advocate of the CSCE as a means of incorporating Central and Eastern European states and creating a true pan-European security system. This approach, however, differs from other European and American positions only in emphasis, since there is general agreement on the need for a meaningful CSCE role. Regarding the CSCE, as with NATO, the EC, and the WEU, Germany has been a supporter of the prevailing view of a future relevance for the

organization. Whether this broad level of support and non-controversial stance can persist for long remains an open question.<sup>96</sup>

On the controversial and delicate topic of European defense structures, Germany has thus far been somewhat non-committal. While joining with France and others in supporting a future security and defense role for the EC and the use of the WEU as its principal vehicle for this, Germany has reiterated the need to avoid hasty decisions or making a false and unnecessary choice between Europe and North America. Additionally, it has echoed the American warning to avoid exclusion of non-WEU members in future security forums. Germany seems unwilling to pursue a course that reduces NATO's or the American role in European security.<sup>97</sup> Confirmation of this came from the German endorsement of NATO's recent step to create a rapid reaction corps, even though such a step angered French President Mitterrand.

Mention of the rapid reaction corps brings up a topic very sensitive to German concerns--the employment of its armed forces outside the NATO area. This issue received considerable attention during the Gulf War, and it has generated great emotions and political debate. Internal divisions within Germany on this topic run deep, and it is not apparent yet whether political consensus can be achieved in the foreseeable future.

Chancellor Kohl, stung by criticism of his public stance in the Gulf War, has led the fight in Germany to change the Basic Law to accommodate a future Germany military role

outside NATO, either under UN auspices or as part of a possible European force such as the WEU. In Kohl's words, "Our partners in the world rightly demand that united Germany make its contribution in the future toward security and stability, not just in Europe but outside Europe as well."<sup>78</sup> Thus far, however, Kohl's initiative has failed to receive the necessary political support in Germany. The opposition Social Democrats have refused to support endorsement beyond that of a possible UN peacekeeping role for German forces. This stalemate represents a major stumbling block for the possible creation of any European intervention force, under the WEU or EC. It also impacts directly on the ability of NATO itself to go beyond a limited definition of its geographic area of security interest. At a time when the United States and other European nations seem to recognize the need for a broader application of security instruments in the future, Germany remains an uncertain participant and reluctant partner.

Regarding the future relationship of the United States to European security, Germany's position is crucial. This is especially true because of Germany's role throughout NATO's history of being the host to the majority of American forces and nuclear weapons in Europe. These American forces have provided the visible evidence coupling European and American security interests. America's commitment to European security has been credible because of the physical presence of its forces on the continent.<sup>79</sup> The same was true in the late 1940s with the reinforcement of American air power during the Berlin Crisis.

With the altered nature of the Soviet military threat in Central Europe and Germany's reunification, the environment for stationing American forces in Europe and Germany has changed significantly. NATO's recent announcement of major force reductions is evidence of the new environment. The growing concern now is the desire not to singularize Germany as the only nation hosting foreign troops. The move toward multinational formations is an attempt to address this issue. Ultimately, German domestic political conditions will determine whether even these formations are supportable in the longer term.<sup>100</sup>

President Bush said that sizable American troops will remain in Europe as long as they are needed and wanted. While the positions of other NATO countries will be important, it will be Germany's support that will be most decisive in influencing the sustainability of American forces in Europe. It is difficult to imagine a meaningful American military presence being maintained in Europe without Germany's active support. Furthermore, it is hard to visualize America's continued influence on Europe's political and security future if American forces are no longer present on the continent.<sup>101</sup> It is also unlikely that NATO would long outlast an American withdrawal from the continent.

The questions of the specific numbers of American forces needed in Germany and whether or not sub-strategic nuclear weapons remain there are not yet resolved. Honest differences of opinion exist even within military circles in the United States, and it is unclear now how important these details are



to future security. What is generally accepted is that a "significant" American military presence is needed to preserve the foundation of the American security commitment to Europe. The upper limits of these forces seem more a function now of the threat perception regarding the Soviet Union and American budgetary constraints. Lower limits, however, are more open and cannot be taken for granted. Without active and enthusiastic European support, and primarily that means German support, there is no assurance that the American presence will be maintained.<sup>102</sup>

On the issue of American military presence in Europe, and probably on the other "structure" issues pending in Europe, Germany will ultimately have the greatest influence. Britain will continue to be the primary advocate of America's security involvement, and France will remain a pivotal country whose actions will have considerable influence. In the final analysis, however, Germany and German policies and actions will have a dominant effect on the specific American role.<sup>103</sup> American leadership will be a major factor along with other European pressures in influencing German views, but German domestic politics will be the forum in which German interests and external variables compete and are resolved. The impact of domestic politics cannot be underestimated, for that is the ultimate source of national political will.<sup>104</sup>

#### 1990-1993: Consensus and Uncertainty

Summarizing this period requires addressing the past, present, and future simultaneously; for all three are relevant

to an understanding of the dynamics at work on this issue. The history of the development and evolution of the European security environment cannot be separated from the questions at hand. Memories of past actions, policies, and threats will continue to influence present and future considerations about European security. Events of the recent past, in particular, have had a dramatic effect and will have a great impact on the decisions to be made in the near future.

As seen in the review of the altered security landscape in 1990, there has been a combination of dramatic events, trends and processes which have contributed to creating this period of transition and decision. The next several years may not see the resolution of all outstanding issues, but this period certainly will witness major efforts at determining the instruments of coping with an uncertain but hopeful future.

In reviewing the discussion of ongoing and future factors and variable in the debate over European security, it is readily apparent that there is a complex variety of sources influencing the debate. Three categories of factors have been addressed--security requirements, American policies and perceptions, and European policies and perceptions. Regarding the security requirements, there are three principal areas comprising the future security needs. The most important single factor without question is the future development and status of the Soviet Union. What occurs within the Soviet Union and what policies are pursued by it or its successor states will determine the primary requirements of any future European security system or set of structures. Joining this

major source of uncertainty is the question of Central and Eastern European development and readjustment, with all its associated challenges and pitfalls. The final source of security requirements comes from outside Europe, in the form of peripheral regional threats and movements, which cannot be ignored and which relate importantly to European security and stability. An important characteristic of all these sources of security requirements is that external actions and influences will have a key role in their future form and development.

Moving from the complex world of security requirements to that of security solutions, it is also apparent that a wide variety of factors are influencing debates in the United States and Europe. Regarding the United States, while American policies seem to be rather clear and consistent from the official perspective, there are constraints being exerted from other domestic pressures and realities. Budgetary pressures especially seem to have a large effect on public attitudes as well as Congressional willingness to support overseas commitments. In general there is an apparent American consensus supporting an active global role, including involvement in European security, but there is a corresponding agreement on the need for others to contribute more to sharing the global burdens.

There appears to be strong American support for a variety of complementary institutions in the future security system. NATO remains the primary focal point of American security involvement in Europe, though not the only instrument.

American military presence in Europe also continues to receive widespread support, provided it is adapted to the new security needs and the limits of fiscal affordability. The issue of the European security dimension presents potentially the most divisive issue for Americans, and it has been the source of most internal debate and friction with Europe.

A rather important observation regarding American policies and attitudes is that the perceptions of European actions have considerable influence on American decisions. In such varied areas as the Gulf War, trade relations, NATO deliberations, and diplomatic relations, what Europeans say and do has a marked impact on corresponding American attitudes and policies. On the topic of security interests and institutions, in particular, there is clearly a dynamic interaction of perceptions and actions between the United States and Europe.

Turning to European policies, it is even more obvious that a multitude of different institutions and unique national views and policies contribute to the overall European picture. The various multinational organizations play a major role in security deliberations within Europe. European integration and all the associated dynamics of the EC activities constitute a principal source of European influence, but even this consuming movement has its sources of discord and uncertainty. The institutional evolutions taking place in Europe today represent a significant source of internal stress as well as a variable in relations with the United States. This has become especially true in regard to proposals for

defining the European security and defense dimension.

Complicating the question of institutional roles is the element of national attitudes and policies. Each country brings its own unique history and perspective into the debate. These national views are being expressed in both multinational forums and in the separate bilateral relations with each other and with the United States. An even further complication is the question of domestic political differences on issues related to security. Taken as a whole, the European perspective, just like the American one, is not a simple matter and consists of a wide array of components.

What can be generalized regarding this multi-faceted European perspective is that there is a consensus favoring a cooperative approach among different institutions as a means of addressing future security needs. There is widespread support among European states for a continued American involvement in European security. Likewise, there is strong support for the future of the European integration movement, though not necessarily agreement on its ultimate size or form. On the subject of specific security and defense structures, no consensus exists on institutional roles and relationships, and this topic is likely to persist as one requiring further resolution. The same is true of the specific nature of America's involvement in European security. Most but not all states favor NATO's continued role. The issue of military structures and potential employment is also one which causes sharp differences of opinion.

The debate in Europe over security structures has already

received wide attention and emphasis. As has been stated in a number of forums, however, it will be substance and not form that exerts the most influence. In the final analysis, concrete and meaningful actions will convey the true intentions of states and organizations. These actions could range in scope from trade issues to basing support to the formation of military units, but they will all reflect fundamental political decisions and thus be perceived as such. These types of actions will be indicative of domestic political choices, but their impact on security considerations could be wide-ranging. Such choices, moreover, will not be made in a vacuum, but will also be influenced by perceptions of external influences, to include that of American policies.

The development of the European security system in the near future will, therefore, be a dynamic process involving changing and uncertain needs, willing but constrained American involvement, and confident but still disunited European efforts. All of these elements will interact and influence one another in this period of readjustment.

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### CHAPTER III

#### 1945-1948 AND 1990-1993: LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLIED

In looking at these two distinct periods in the course of this examination of European security, it has been obvious that both eras include a wide variety of interests, influences, and pressures. The specific events and circumstances, of course, differ considerably across the distance of over four decades. Yet, both periods represent similar times of decision regarding two critical questions: the future shape of the European security system, and the role of the United States in that system. Within these two different eras, choices would be made that would have lasting implications for Europe and the world. Having reviewed these periods of transition in European security in some detail, it is appropriate to conclude by making some comparisons between them. What are the main differences, the similarities, and what can be expected in the future?

Though this paper began by pointing out some common characteristics of the two periods and especially the defining years of 1945 and 1990, it is fitting here to highlight some

major differences. In terms of a European security system and the American role in it, the post-World War II era began with no such system in existence and with no tradition of American involvement. America's involvement in Europe in World War II had been for specific national interests which happened to coincide then with those of its principal allies, Britain and the Soviet Union. Once the common goal of defeating Nazi Germany had been accomplished, the unifying forces were surpassed by individual national objectives and interests. Even the extremely close and successful British-American bonds during the war quickly became less binding when the postwar adjustment began.

The 1990-1993 period, in comparison, began with the pattern and success of a European security system having been well entrenched. In fact, this system had been the by-product of the 1945-1948 era and had been firmly embedded in the intervening period. The same holds true for American involvement in European security. While the 1945-1948 period had no background of active American involvement, 1990-1993 began with it being a recognized reality. The net result of this historical inheritance of both an existing system and an entrenched American role is that inertia of continuity will mitigate against radical or rapid change. This is not to say, however, that change is impossible; rather, that it will just take more conscious effort.

Another major difference in the two periods is the condition of Europe. After World War II Western Europe was in both a political and security vacuum. Great uncertainty

existed about future domestic political direction as well as the extent of cooperation between countries in the region. The defeat and destruction of Germany left the principal source of uncertainty in the heart of Europe. Today's period of transition, fortunately, has a different situation. Western Europe is very stable politically, and the pattern of close cooperation and even integration pervades across the spectrum of issues. The security vacuum today rests further to the east, in Central and Eastern Europe where the readjustments to a new political era are just beginning.

On the related topic of Europe's economic condition, the two periods also have stark differences. After World War II Europe faced formidable challenges of rebuilding and reorganization. Basic survival could not even be taken for granted, and the feeling of desperation was not uncommon. Today's Europe, particularly Western Europe, stands as a prosperous and expanding economic power that can address its own needs and help others in the world meet their needs. The eastern part of Europe does face major economic problems, but in comparison with other areas in the world, Europe seems more than capable of dealing with the challenges ahead.

America's position also has distinct contrasts in the two periods. After World War II the United States stood as the overwhelming economic power in the world. Having come out of the war as the only major power to have gained in its absolute strength and economic base, the United States enjoyed a clear world preeminence. Such preeminence was temporary, however, and as the rest of the world recovered in the subsequent



years, the United States returned to its more normal position of relative prominence. Thus, in the 1990s the United States still has the world's largest economy, but one only slightly larger than that of the combined European Community. America had not so much "declined," as had the rest of the world, namely Europe and Japan, succeeded in their postwar recoveries.

A final area of distinct difference in these periods is the condition of the Soviet Union. While suffering greatly during World War II, the Soviet Union did emerge as the dominant conventional military power in Europe. In the late 1940s it also appeared to represent a source of dynamic expansion and influence in Europe and throughout the world. By contrast, as the 1990s begin the Soviet Union seems on the verge of chaos and even collapse, and it no longer represents a source for change to be envied or feared. Though still a major force in terms of its military power, the Soviet Union's political influence and economic power are in relative decline.

Given these somewhat dramatic differences between the two periods, are there enough similarities to make comparisons useful today? The answer is clearly yes. First and foremost, as has been mentioned, the two major questions at stake are the same in both transitional periods. The issues of European security and the American role are effectively the same, and the two periods are close enough in time and memory to make comparisons very relevant. Moreover, in broad terms the fundamental elements influencing choices are quite

similar. There is the disappearance of a clear and immediate security threat combined with the realization of a continuing need for security in an uncertain world. Domestic political influences and economic and financial constraints, both in the United States and Europe, remain important variables in all policy formulation, to include security issues. Both periods are also characterized by decreasing Western military structures, yet a world replete with dangers and sources of armed conflict. In summary, while much is different, there is still a great similarity of questions and factors influencing the answers.

Without reviewing the details again here, it is worth summarizing the factors in the 1945-1948 period that ultimately contributed to the creation of a European security system with an active American role. The postwar period saw an America preoccupied with domestic needs and demands which was attempting to remain somewhat aloof from direct participation in European security requirements. Worsening international relations, however, and the growing perception of real threats to American interests contributed to a change in attitude. Economic limitations and needs, especially in Britain and Western Europe, brought about a corresponding realization that the United States could no longer depend on others to secure its interests abroad. Economic requirements caused early steps toward involvement, but it was the perception of strategic and security interests and threats in 1948 that convinced America that substantive action was necessary. Soviet actions and American and Western

perceptions of those actions brought the United States to the position of seeing the need for its own direct involvement in European security.

American commitment and active participation in a European security system came about as the result of strong European initiatives, primarily from Britain, to organize among themselves and then encourage and support active American involvement. European action in signing the Brussels Treaty in early 1948 was a necessary precursor to America's own willingness to enter a common defense system.

The common efforts in meeting the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1948 ended up as the final catalyst in bringing the first postwar American military reinforcements to Europe. The American willingness to deploy its strategic air power to Europe and the European willingness to support that deployment cemented the bonds of an indivisible security relationship. America's military forces in Europe, though relatively few in number, became the symbol of its commitment to Europe's security. At the same time, negotiations began to formalize the arrangements for what became the North Atlantic Alliance in April 1949.

The current period of transition and decision is likely to experience a similar interaction of the determining factors which influenced the postwar years. There is already considerable pressure in America for a shifting of emphasis away from overseas commitments and security burdens to the demands of domestic priorities. Such pressure is both natural and probably desirable. After all, it is the overall internal

strength and vitality of the United States itself which represents its greatest asset and source of influence abroad. These domestic pressures along with real budgetary constraints serve to set the limits of American involvement in terms of military and economic instruments. It is apparent, however, that the United States does continue to see its active involvement in Europe and the world as being in American interests. The potential for American involvement, just as in the post-World War II period, remains largely a function of its domestic well-being and political leadership.

If America's domestic strength and leadership primarily shape its capability for involvement, the requirement for that involvement in security matters is formed by external events and the perceptions of these events. In the 1990s, as discussed earlier, the primary sources of security threats and needs come from the future development of the Soviet Union, the challenges and dangers of Central and Eastern European readjustment, and from states and movements on Europe's periphery with potential for wider impact. These developments are the object of much ongoing attention, but they are not entirely preventable or controllable by American or European efforts. In the long run they will determine the security needs that face Europe and the United States. It will be the American and European perceptions of these developments and the dangers associated with them that ultimately turns national interests and objectives into concrete security efforts.

As in the 1945-1948 period, it will be European actions

that influence the final and specific definition of America's involvement in European security. In the late 1940s, it was the American perception of the Europeans' willingness to cooperate in their own defense and to support American participation that led to formal American involvement and commitment. In the 1990s, while the specific circumstances and issues are different, it will once again be the American perception of European actions that has the most influence on the specific way that Americans are involved.

Policy statements and organizations are important in themselves, but substantive action which reflects true political will and domestic support will eventually have the greatest impact. For that reason, much of the focus of future decisions affecting European security has to be within European states where the political decisions have to be made. Decisions within European organizations will be very important for security issues, but for the foreseeable future the key political decisions will still be made within individual states. Of all the European states, Germany appears the one most pivotal in influencing America's future involvement in European security. Both because of its relative power and position in Europe and because of its critical role in hosting most of the American military forces in Europe, Germany will have a major role in deciding how the European security system will develop and whether and how the United States remains a part of it.

In all of these categories of determining factors--the security requirements, American policies and perceptions, and

European policies and perceptions--the review of both periods reveals a common trait. That is the dynamic interaction which goes on within and between all these factors. All have mutual influence and develop in an atmosphere of external pressures.

For the future decisions about the American role in European security, one can learn from the past as well as the present. The need for American involvement will be determined primarily by the external events which shape the threat. The potential for American involvement will come from within the United States through its domestic capabilities and leadership. Finally, the specific manner of American involvement will rest in American perceptions of European actions which express national and collective political wills. Answers and solutions are not foreordained now, any more than they were in the 1940s. Building upon the lessons of the past, hopefully the decisions of the future will take Europe and the world securely and safely into the beginning of the 21st century.

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